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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Variations in Patterns of Low Fertility in South Korea in 2004:  
 
A County Level Analysis. (August 2006) 
 
Jungwon Yoon, B.A., Soongsil University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
 
 
 
Since the early 1960s, South Korea has been going through a rapid fertility 
decline, along with its socioeconomic development and effective family planning 
programs.  After achieving a desired replacement level of fertility in 1984, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) of Korea has gradually declined to the level of lowest-low fertility.  
According to 2004 vital statistics, the TFR for Korea was 1.16—below the lowest-low 
fertility level of 1.3.  Also, Korea’s fertility rates have fluctuated and varied spatially, 
even at the level of low fertility.   
Undoubtedly, Korean family planning programs have been effective in 
population control through the last 40 years, but since 2000, the shift to pro-natal 
policies indicates that Korea’s fertility transition is no longer a response to family 
planning policies.  Rather, the level of socioeconomic development is still considered to 
have a significant effect on Korea’s fertility decline.  Thus, in this thesis, the primary 
objective is to examine the socioeconomic determinants of fertility differentials and the 
variation in low fertility among the counties in South Korea in 2004.  Using data from 
the 2000 census and 2004 vital statistics, I tested the hypothesized relationships between 
the level of socioeconomic development and fertility based on the demographic 
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transition theory (DTT), by estimating several Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple 
regression models. 
Specifically, socioeconomic predictors, such as agricultural attainment, labor 
force participation, and educational attainment, were primarily examined to test the 
validity of the DTT hypotheses.  In addition, this thesis also examined the effects of 
women’s status and traditional norms and cultural values on variation in fertility.  My 
results showed that the DTT is applicable to an accounting of the variance in fertility 
rates among the Korean counties in 2004.  Although the levels of fertility are extremely 
low all across the country, it is apparent that socioeconomic conditions are having an 
impact on fertility differentials in Korea.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
South Korea, with a population of over 47 million, has experienced a remarkable 
decline in fertility.  The demographic revolution which began in the country in the 1960s, 
marked by rapid socioeconomic development, caused a transition that, over time, 
dramatically changed the fertility rates: between 1960 and 1983 the total fertility rate 
(TFR) of South Korea fell from 6.0 to the replacement level fertility of 2.1 (see 
FIGURE 1).  In the mid 1980s, the TFR of South Korea was even lower than that of 
most western European countries.  In 2004, the TFR of South Korea declined to 1.16, 
making it the lowest fertility rate in the world.    
In addition to this fertility decline, the mortality level of Korea has also 
drastically declined over time.  The crude death rate per 1,000 Koreans decreased from 
16 in 1960 to 5.1 in 2004 (see FIGURE 2).  This rapid demographic transition provides 
tremendous momentum for the current rate of population aging in South Korea.  
Consequently, low fertility not only brought about the depopulation of the country, but 
also an increase in the elderly population and a decrease in the working-age population.  
These elements together expose various socioeconomic problems currently affecting 
South Korea.  
The rapid decline in fertility in Korea was due mainly to socioeconomic 
development and a “very successful” adoption of the government-led family planning  
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programs.  Since the 1960s, South Korea’s rapid economic development has been hailed 
as one of the most successful in the developing world.  Before 1961, the level of 
economic development was very low and population growth was high, resulting in 
prevalent poverty throughout the country (Cho and Lee 1999).  However, 16 May 1961 
marked a turning point in modern Korean history.  On that day, General Park Chung 
Hee led a military coup which brought an end to a corrupt and inept government and 
achieved significant economic development.  Under the leadership of Park’s 
administration, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was founded on 22 July 1961, only 
two months after the coup.  This became the nerve center of Park’s plan to promote 
economic development.  Economic programs of rapid industrialization based on exports 
were launched.  These Korean governmental efforts were reflected in the First Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan (1962-66), and the subsequent Second (1967-71), Third 
(1972-76), Fourth (1977-81) and Fifth (1982-86) five year economic development plans.   
During the first five-year economic development plan, Korea’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) expanded at an annual rate of 7% and continued to grow rapidly.  In 2004, 
Korea’s GDP size ranked 10th in the world at $680 billion, which is a substantial 
increase from the $4 billion recorded in 1960.  The escalation marks a growth of 
approximately 167 times the original size in only 44 years.  South Korea’s miraculous 
achievement is one of the most remarkable economic development stories of the 
twentieth century. 
At the same time, the Korean government launched a full-scale national family 
planning program in 1962, along with a series of five-year economic development plans, 
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all of which have been very effective in controlling the country’s previously high rate of 
fertility (I. K. Kim 1987).  The Korean government actively campaigned for a family 
planning program because it was believed that the expanding population was 
undermining economic prosperity.  Thus, national family planning programs were 
vigorously implemented throughout the successive five-year economic development 
plans, with demographic targets of reducing the annual population growth rate and the 
total fertility rate of the country (Cho and Lee 1999).  According to Yang (1991), “the 
main reasons for adopting the categorical family planning approach were: 1) the urgency 
of the population problem required that family planning be given priority over other 
health programs, such as tuberculosis control and maternal and child health:  2) 
development of the maternal and child health program in Korea was in an infant stage, 
and it would have taken too much time and cost to develop:  3) the maternal and child 
health program would have claimed the majority of the limited available budget” (Cho 
and Lee 1999: 32).                               
In 1971, the Korean Institute for Family Planning was established in an attempt 
to eliminate cultural preferences for male children and to reduce fertility rates to a target 
level of 2.1.  The government emphasized high initial rates of contraceptive use and 
small families, both of which have been major components in the decline in fertility; 
however, participation in the programs was voluntary.  There were also special programs 
for the urban poor, including postpartum contraceptive distributions and financial 
incentives for acceptors of sterilization (Choe et al. 2005).  Since these new and simple 
methods of female sterilization were introduced in 1974, sterilization has become the 
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most popular form of contraception (Choe et al. 2005).  As a result of this governmental 
effort, the use of contraceptives has increased from 44.2 percent in 1976 to 77.1 percent 
in 1988 (Cho and Lee 1999).    
During the 1970s, the well-known family planning slogans “Regardless of sons 
or daughters, stop at two and raise them well” and “A well bred girl surpasses ten boys” 
spread throughout the country via mass media public campaigns.  A 2-child family norm 
was further facilitated by the consistent enforcement of Korean governmental policies 
directed at controlling population growth.  Consequently, the TFR of Korea in 1984 
reached 1.76, which was the first time in Korean history that the TFR fell below the 
replacement level.  Having achieved significant decreases in population growth and 
fertility, the Korean government then turned to a more moderate population policy, 
reducing the annual sterilization targets in 1986 from 300,000 to 60,000 by 1991.  
Although the national family planning programs achieved the desired 
replacement level of fertility by the mid 1980s, Korean population policies continued to 
encourage small family size by “broadening economic incentives for sterilization 
acceptors with one or two children, and limiting family allowance and other benefits to 
two children” (Choe et al. 2005: 6).  In 1986, the family planning programs began 
promoting one-child families with the slogan: “Even two children for a family is too 
many for over-crowded Korea.”  Consequently, even after the achievement of the 
desired replacement level of fertility, the TFR of Korea continued to decline to far below 
the replacement level of fertility.   
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After the mid 1980s, sex-selective abortion was widely used, producing a severe 
imbalance in the sex ratio of live births.  The Korean government legalized induced 
abortions under certain conditions for medical reasons and allowed paramedical intra-
uterine device insertion in 1973 (Cho and Lee 1999).  Both factors played an important 
role in maintaining both a preference for male children and below replacement levels of 
fertility during the 1980s.  When the use of the ultrasound for antenatal examinations 
became widely available, Korean women with a strong desire to have a son began 
relying on induced abortion to terminate unwanted pregnancies (Choe et al. 2005).  The 
TFR fell from 2.83 in 1980 to 1.59 in 1990, and the sex ratio at birth increased from 
105.3 to 116.5.   
Given the above, Korea’s population policies began focusing on the elimination 
of the cultural preference for male children and sex-selective abortions.  First, in 1987 
the Korean government revised the Medical Law to forbid premarital sex and sex-
selective abortions.  Secondly, efforts to eliminate gender inequality were strengthened; 
in 1989 the Korean government revised the Family Law for daughters so that they too 
would have the right to be household heads and receive an equal share of any inheritance 
(Cho and Lee 1999).  The Medical Law was revised once again in 1994 to impose higher 
penalties for medical personnel who provided prenatal sex determination (up to 3 years 
of imprisonment, and up to a US $12,500 fine in addition to the loss of the individual’s 
professional license) (Choe et al. 2005).  In response to the government’s strong 
regulations, the frequency of sex selective abortions began to drop in the mid 1990s; the 
sex ratio at birth decreased from 115.2 in 1994 to 109.6 in 1999. 
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By 1990, the TFR of Korea was far below the replacement level.  The negative 
consequences of this rapid fertility decline, including an unbalanced sex ratio of 
newborns, an increase in the elderly population, and a high prevalence of selective 
abortions, were also emerging (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).   
These new trends led to a debate regarding the direction of future population 
policies in Korea.  Two groups argued about the direction of population policies.  The 
first was comprised of those who supported the continuation of fertility control, arguing 
that the current level of low fertility was primarily due to the strong population control 
policies and that a change in policy would increase the fertility level.  An increase would 
result in another era of rapid population growth, consequently slowing down economic 
growth and having adverse effects on the environment and resources (Choe et al. 2005).  
The second group supported a relaxation of fertility control policies, arguing that the 
socioeconomic conditions of South Korea have changed.  These changes in attitudes and 
values toward a preference for smaller sized families and a further decline in fertility 
would result in rapid population aging and an increased burden of support for the elderly 
(Choe et al. 2005).   
In the end, in 1996, “the Korean government officially announced the adoption 
of a ‘new population policy’ which focused on the quality of life and welfare of the 
Korean population” (I. K. Kim 2001: 4).  The characteristics of this new family planning 
program marked a change from the quantitative control of the population to more 
qualitative considerations.   
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The major goals of the new population policy were 1) to maintain the TFR level 
of 1.7, 2) to improve the morbidity and life expectation levels of the population as part 
of the process of achieving sustainable socioeconomic development, 3) to enhance 
family health and welfare, 4) to prevent an imbalance of sex ratios at birth and to reduce 
the incidence of induced abortions, 5) to expand the scope of the family planning 
program’s target population to cover the young unmarried population (in an effort to 
prevent premarital pregnancy), 6) to empower women by expanding employment 
opportunities and welfare services and 7) to improve work opportunities and provide 
adequate health care and welfare services for the elderly (Cho and Lee 1999).  The one-
child family norm was eliminated in the new family planning programs. 
However, despite the government’s moderate family planning efforts, the TFR of 
Korea continued to decline until it approached its current 1.0 level.  Compared to the 
effects of the family planning programs conducted between 1960 and 1980, the new 
program has not played a significant role in fertility change, which has been stationary 
for the most part since the mid 1990s.  On the other hand, socioeconomic conditions 
have tended to influence the decline in fertility.  During the Asian economic downturn of 
the mid 1990s, both an unstable household economy and high unemployment, sustained 
by a national financial crisis, played decisive roles in delaying marriage and widening 
the birth interval.  Thus, these non-demographic issues furthered the fertility decline in 
Korea. 
In 2000, the TFR of South Korea was below 1.5, and by 2002 it had dropped to 
approximately 1.10.  The TFR of 2004 and 2005 approached 1.16 and 1.08, respectively, 
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both of which indicate ‘lowest low fertility.’1  In response to this lowest low fertility 
level, the Korean government declared in 2004 a policy shift to a pro-natal policy aimed 
at boosting the fertility rate (D. Kim 2005).  This marked an important change in the 44-
year history of Korean population policy.  In 2004, the Korean government established a 
Population Policy Deliberation Committee in order to develop new pro-natal policy 
directions and measures for the future.  Subsequently, in 2005 another new population 
policy was adopted with the goal of formulating comprehensive policies dealing with the 
consequences of low fertility and population aging, and of increasing the total fertility 
level to 1.6 by 2010 (Choe et al. 2005).   
The Korean government has recently attempted to promote childbirth 
encouragement policies.  However, the Korean pro-natal policies of 2004 and 2005 have 
not had much of an influence to date on fertility.  “Fertility has continued to decline 
recently in Japan and several low fertility European countries in spite of their 
governments’ economic support for childcare, family-friendly workplace arrangements, 
and the provision of more flexible work opportunities for mothers” (D. Kim 2005: 19).  
Compared to these countries, the Korean government’s economic support is very limited.  
“The small amount of economic support for childcare and some family-friendly 
workplace arrangements for mothers are not likely to have a significant influence on 
young couples who have strong desires to maintain reasonable standards of living in a 
competitive society with high educational costs” (D. Kim 2005: 21).   
                                                 
1 According to Billari (2004), the term ‘low fertility’ can be used when fertility is below the replacement 
level of 2.1.  The term ‘very low fertility’ can be used when fertility is below a TFR of 1.5.  And the term 
‘lowest-low fertility’ can be used when fertility is below a TFR of 1.3.          
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In response to these problems, in 2006 the Korean government announced that 
$19.3 billion would be invested by 2010 in efforts to boost the fertility rate.  The new 
governmental plan includes expanding day care services and preschool education for 
infants, improving childcare facilities, providing full income payments to female 
employees on maternity leave, and financial support for sterile couples attempting to 
have babies through medical procedures.           
As discussed earlier, family planning programs have not played a significant role 
recently in fertility changes in South Korea.  Although the fertility decline in the past 
was due, in part, to the family planning program implemented in the country, the current 
decline does not seem to be responding to the current family planning program.  Despite 
new family planning programs implemented in 2004, the TFR declined from 1.16 in 
2004 to 1.08 in 2005.  Therefore, in the research to be conducted in this thesis, family 
planning programs will be excluded in my analysis of county-level fertility.  Rather, this 
research will focus on the socioeconomic effects on fertility differentials and the 
variation in low fertility among the various counties in South Korea in 2004.   
According to 2004 vital statistics, the general fertility rate (GFR) of Korea was 
34.72.  It fluctuated spatially.  The GFR among the provinces varied from a low of 26.32 
in the Busan municipality to a high of 40.63 in Jeju Province.  The GFR among the 
various counties varied from a low of 21.6 in Gangseo-gu to a high of 54.31 in 
Hwacheon-gun.  Not surprisingly, even the upper values of the GFR for both the Korean 
provinces and the counties are considered to be extremely low. 
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Why does the fertility rate fluctuate and vary?  What accounts for variance in the 
fertility rate?  What factors (e.g., social, economic, political, cultural, or environmental 
effects) play a significant role in accounting for variation in fertility among the counties 
in South Korea?  In this thesis, these questions will be addressed in an attempt to better 
understand the dynamics of fertility among the counties of South Korea in 2004. 
Most previous Korean fertility studies have been conducted at the country or 
province level.  Very little demographic analysis of fertility has been conducted at the 
level of the county.  In 2004 the GFR for Yangpyeong county in Gyeonggi province was 
32.24, whereas the GFR for Osan county in same province was 52.53.  Even though both 
counties are in the same province, the question remains: why are their fertility rates so 
different?   
In past research, socioeconomic factors and national family planning programs 
have been regarded as having the most effect on Korean fertility.  Without a doubt, 
socioeconomic development (which has facilitated the successful implementation of 
national family planning) has been an important contributor to the decline in Korea’s 
fertility (Cho and Lee 1999).  Urbanization, along with rapid economic development, an 
increase in educational attainment for both males and females, and greater gender 
equality regarding educational and occupational opportunities tended to yield the lowest 
fertility.  Thus, the general hypothesis of this thesis is based on demographic transition 
theory (DTT) that socioeconomic development is negatively associated with fertility.      
Therefore, in this thesis several socioeconomic and related factors are 
hypothesized to be related to fertility among the counties in Korea.  Variables such as 
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agricultural population, educational attainment, economic conditions, cultural norms, the 
status of women and gender equity in educational attainment are all expected to be 
significantly associated with the general fertility rate (GFR).       
First, the percentage of agricultural population in each county is expected to be 
positively associated with fertility.  In other words, the percentage of the population 
engaged in agriculture should be positively related to the GFR.  It is well documented 
that the rapid process of urbanization throughout the country largely reduced the 
agricultural population—in 2004 the percentage of agricultural population in South 
Korea was measured to be only 7.1 percent of the whole population.   
Other socioeconomic variables such as educational attainment and economic 
conditions are expected to be negatively related to the GFR.  The improvement in 
education levels in Korea has been attributed to parents’ zeal to provide to their children 
higher levels of schooling, which has been further facilitated by the rise in income and 
decline in number of children (Cho and Lee 1999).  While the TFR decreased from 2.83 
in 1980 to 1.47 in 1998, the advancement rate to college level or higher for high school 
graduates increased from 43.3 percent to 84.4 percent (Cho and Lee 1999).   
Economic conditions should also have an important influence on fertility in 
Korea.  During the Asian economic downturn in the mid 1990s, the unemployment rate 
was drastically high in Korea.  Consequently, “the labor market’s insecurity due to a 
remarkable increase in unemployment, layoffs, and part-time and temporary jobs played 
a decisive role in delaying marriage and widening the birth interval,” (D. Kim 2005: 13) 
and thus has had a significant effect on fertility in Korea.  Since the Korean national 
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economic crisis in 1997, the unemployment rate increased from 2.6 in 1997 to 7.0 in 
1998, while the TFR decreased from 1.54 to 1.47.  Although recovery from the 
economic recession has occurred since early 1999, the TFR of Korea has continued to 
decline.         
In addition, gender equity in educational attainment and the increase of women in 
the labor force are expected to have negative associations with the GFR.  In other words, 
the rise of both educational and labor force participation opportunities for women tends 
to result in lower fertility rates.  The Korean economic crisis promoted two income 
marriages and female labor force participation in Korea.  The rate of female labor force 
participation has increased from 47.1 in 1998 to 49.8 in 2004.  Consequently, the 
increase in female labor force participation and the equal access to education for both 
males and females have both led to the rise of women’s overall social status in Korean 
society.    
Finally, the prevalence of traditional family norms and cultural values are 
expected to be related to fertility.  The sex ratio at birth, the marriage rate, and the 
divorce rate are all anticipated to be related to the GFR, the first two in a positive 
direction, the third in a negative direction.     
Socioeconomic development in Korea has promoted rapid urbanization and 
modernization, and as a result has had a huge impact on changes in traditional values 
and family norms.  Since the mid 1990s, “Korean women’s attitudes toward marriage 
and gender roles are changing rapidly” (Choe et al. 2004: 7).  Currently, the notion of 
“marriage is optional, but a job is mandatory,” is pervasive among many Korean young 
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women and explains the rapid decrease in the marriage rate in South Korea.  The 
decrease in the TFR and the sex ratio at birth suggest that some fundamental changes in 
fertility behavior have been taking place.  Several studies of attitudes toward marriage 
and family-building behaviors document that by the mid-1990s, traditional values such 
as the “oughtness” of marriage, parenthood, and having a son have considerably 
lessened (Bumpass and Choe 2004).  Furthermore, it has been suggested that an increase 
in the divorce rate may be due to financial problems resulting from the economic crisis 
in 1997 (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  But there has also been an increase in divorce 
among couples who have been married for a long time.  These results indicate that the 
high rate of divorce was not only due to economic problems but to changes in traditional 
family norms in Korea.       
The research to be conducted in this thesis could be very useful for investigating 
the nation’s current demographic conditions and for suggesting better future population 
policy options.  According to 2004 vital statistics, South Korea’s county-level fertility 
rate fluctuated, although was extremely low.  Considering the variance in fertility among 
the different counties could help researchers better understand the fundamental causes of 
the current low level of fertility in the country.  In this context, this thesis will explore 
the variation in the GFR among the different counties within the nine provinces and 
seven municipalities, and will examine a mixture of sociological and demographic 
explanations.  
Over the last few decades, the pattern of fertility decline in South Korea has 
changed.  But there have to date been only a limited number of fertility analyses.  This 
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thesis expects to provide empirical findings about the effects of low fertility and fertility 
differentials across the country through an analysis of current county levels of fertility in 
South Korea in 2004.  This study also expects to provide empirical findings which could 
lay the foundation for designing future pro-natal policies in Korea.   
For its analysis, this thesis uses the latest vital statistics (collected in 2004) and 
2000 census data.  Although there are data limitations (since most Korean census data 
are based on province-level numbers and do not include specific indicators such as per 
capita income) the available statistics should provide useful data for the analysis of the 
current decline in Korean fertility.   
The following chapter reviews the various socio-demographic explanations for 
fertility decline and the findings of previously conducted empirical studies of Korean 
fertility.         
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, a detailed review of pertinent Korean fertility studies, spanning 
nearly two decades, will be presented.  Although none of the studies was conducted at 
the county level, each investigated various socioeconomic effects on Korea’s fertility 
decline.  Before reviewing Korea’s fertility studies, a brief account of the Demographic 
Transition Theory (DTT) will be provided as the main theoretical framework for this 
thesis.  In this thesis, the DTT is expected to provide a reasonable standing of recent 
patterns of fertility decline in South Korea.      
Demographic Transition Theory 
Fertility decline from a high level to a low level occurred first in Western Europe 
between the middle of the 19th century and the middle of the 21st century.  The DTT 
explains how populations change from high levels of fertility and mortality to low levels 
of fertility and mortality.  These changes are heavily based on observed, historical 
changes in the West that link fertility and mortality changes to social, economic, and 
family changes caused by industrialization and urbanization (Notestein 1953).  Given 
that it analyzes a substantial frame of time, the DTT argues that socioeconomic 
developments have been accompanied by notable fertility declines.     
The earliest effort in the West to account for fertility declines was made by 
Warren Thompson (1929), Kingsley Davis (1945), and Frank Notestein (1945, 1953).  
Their research became the foundation of the theory of demographic transition 
(Hirschman 2005), which mainly assumes that socioeconomic developments lead to a 
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fertility decline.  “The original accounts of this theory specified a variety of causal 
mechanisms, including the declining role of the family in economic organization, the 
independence of women from traditional roles, and the shift to rationality spurred by 
popular education” (Hirschman 2005: 393).  An early iteration of the DTT, published by 
Warren Thompson in 1929, described a general historical theory of the relationship 
between population and economic growth which eventually became the basis for the 
subsequently developed theory of demographic transition (Szreter 1993).  This earlier 
version of the DTT was maintained over the following decades and materialized in the 
1940s as the Demographic Transition Theory (DTT)—chiefly due to the effort of Frank 
Notestein (Hirschman 1994; Notestein 1953). 
Fundamentally, the DTT posits that socioeconomic development indicators such 
as industrialization, modernization, urbanization, and changes in social values and norms 
are all pre-conditions necessary for the fertility transition (Notestein 1953).  In other 
words, both fertility rates and mortality rates, in response to an increase in 
socioeconomic development, are central to this theory.  The timing of the studied 
fertility responses depends on the level of socioeconomic development and 
modernization.   
According to Notestein (1953), fertility decline is attributed to changes in social 
life that are presumed to be caused by industrialization and urbanization (Mason 1997): 
The new ideal of the small family arose typically in the urban industrial society.   
Urban life stripped the family of many functions in production, consumption,  
recreation, and education…The new mobility of young people and the anonymity  
of city life reduced the pressure toward traditional behavior exerted by the family  
and the community….As a consequence, the cost of child-rearing grew and the  
possibilities for economic contributions by children declined….Women,  
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moreover, found new independence from household obligations and new  
economic roles less compatible with childbearing (Notestein 1953: 13-31).    
   
Kingsley Davis (1963) also asserted that “mortality reduction is the 
quintessential harbinger of the demographic transition” (Crenshaw et al. 2000: 1).  When 
child mortality levels are improved, households tend to choose upward social mobility 
over having more children.  He believed that “a fertility decline is triggered when one or 
more associated conditions reach certain threshold values” (D. Kim 2005: 5).  To 
determine the threshold required for a particular fertility decline, Ansley Coale (1973) 
has pointed out that “there is more than one pre-condition for a decline in marital 
fertility: (1) fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice, (2) reduced fertility 
must be perceived as (economically) advantageous, and (3) effective techniques of 
fertility reduction must be available” (Kirk 1996: 365).    
While the DTT has been widely accepted as a generalized description of the 
evolution of the demographic process, “challenges to the historical and contemporary 
relevance and accuracy of [the] DTT have mounted” (Crenshaw et al. 2000: 371).  Since 
the DTT has not performed that well in accounting for the timing of a particular fertility 
decline, Hirschman has noted that “over the past few decades intensive research on 
demographic change in historical and contemporary societies has revealed complex 
patterns that do not fit neatly into earlier theoretical schema” (Hirschman 1994: 204).  
This theoretical and methodological unfitness has taken its toll on the DTT, leading 
some demographers to conclude “….that [the] DTT is near death” (Hirschman 1994: 
213).     
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According to Knodel and van de Walle (1979), the initial decline in fertility was 
not necessarily a response to prior changes in urbanization, education, agricultural 
detachment, or labor force participation: “(1) fertility declines took place under a wide 
variety of social, economic, and demographic conditions; (2) family limitation was not 
practiced among broad sections of the population of births—many have been unwanted; 
(3) increases in the practice of family planning and the decline of marital fertility were 
both essentially irreversible processes, once under way; and (4) a cultural setting 
influenced the onset and spread of fertility decline independent of socio-economic 
conditions” (p. 219).  Consequently, many objections, qualifications, and doubts serve as 
modifications to, and extensions of, the DTT.      
Lesthaeghe (1995; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988) has extended the classic DTT 
“by adding to economic modernization a shift in values toward individualism and self-
fulfillment that occurs with rising affluence and secularization” (Mason 1997: 444).  He 
believes that fertility differentials are associated with cultural differences, religious 
beliefs, materialism and individualism (Lesthaeghe 1995).  But since this addition to 
DTT is based on western European countries, it may not be applicable to the fertility 
transition in some Asian developing countries that still retain strong traditional values.   
The Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory of fertility stresses that fertility 
behavior is determined by three determinants: income, the cost of children, and the 
preference for children, all of which are basic driving forces in fertility transition 
(Schultz 1973).  Easterlin (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985) broadened the Microeconomic 
Fertility Model by combining economic and sociological theories of fertility decline.  
 19
 
His framework elaborates three determinants of fertility behavior: 1) the demand for 
children—the standard socio-economic determinants of fertility transition; 2) the supply 
of children—a cultural determinant that constrains natural fertility; and 3) the psychic, 
monetary, and time costs (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985).  However, this microeconomic 
theory has little input with regards to the institutional determinants that trigger a fertility 
decline (Mason 1997).  As Hirschman (1994) notes, the Microeconomic Theory of 
Fertility is too narrow to replace the DTT.        
Caldwell (1982) restated the DTT by stressing the growth of the industrial 
system as one of the fundamental forces that leads to the dismantling of traditional 
familial norms and of low fertility.  Unlike the classic DTT, he made an important 
distinction between ‘modernization’ and ‘westernization,’ but the primary force in 
fertility change appears to be westernization, which includes ideas of progress, 
secularization, mass education, and mastery over the environment (Kirk 1996).  He 
argued that the predominance of the nuclear family in modern societies is attributed to 
westernization, making children a decisive economic burden, as well as the consequence 
of a reversal in the direction of “wealth flows” from children to parents in pre-modern 
societies.  His restatement of the DTT, however, “does not clarify the nature of the 
specific appeal of westernized values and family systems” (Kirk 1996: 372).  Also, 
Freedman (1979) and colleagues have noted that Caldwell’s theory does not account for 
the fertility decline in East Asian countries where fertility has decreased with little 
apparent change in regards to extended family relationships (Thornton and Fricke 1987; 
Mason 1997).  For instance, the extended family system is still in place in some low-
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fertility Asian countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, and China, indicating that the 
nuclear family (a western concept) is not a prerequisite for fertility decline.           
Therefore, the mass of unsatisfactory restatements of the DTT force this thesis to 
rely upon an original formulation of the DTT.  A number of empirical studies have 
criticized the DTT, but “the theory has ideas that are hard to ignore that live on” (Mason 
1997: 444).  Despite the fact that the broad scope of the DTT specified a variety of 
causal mechanisms for fertility decline, the original accounts of the theory still remain 
the basis for the most widely accepted theoretical framework.  As Hirschman points out, 
“the portrayal of [the] DTT as a universal model of modernization and fertility decline is 
too general and vague, but there is a considerable body of evidence that socioeconomic 
development has been more influential in shaping historical and contemporary fertility 
declines than many critics have acknowledged” (Hirschman 2005: 394).   
Many demographers argue that the characteristics of the demographic transition 
in some developing countries in East Asia are different from those of the transition that 
occurred in Western countries.  Since many indicators were considered as predictors of 
the transition from high to low fertility, there were many potential hypotheses 
(depending upon the different regions).  In the case of South Korea, fertility decline has 
long been assumed to be a consequence of socioeconomic development and successful 
governmental family planning programs.  In this thesis, I expect to show that the DTT is 
plausible for use in accounting for variation in the fertility of the counties of South 
Korea.  As mentioned earlier, while the new pro-natal policy (implemented in 2004) had 
had little effect on the state of Korea’s fertility, socioeconomic changes are still 
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considered to be significantly associated with Korea’s recent low fertility and 
geographical fluctuations.  I will now provide an overview of Korean fertility studies 
and their findings. 
Korean Fertility Studies 
Doo-Sub Kim (2005) has developed theoretical explanations of why and how 
Korea passed through the first fertility transition that occurred from 1960 to 1985, and 
the second fertility transition that occurred from 1985 to the present (D. Kim 2005).  He 
observed that a satisfactory theoretical framework and structure of knowledge is needed, 
depending upon the different countries analyzed, in order to establish the general validity 
of the DTT (D. Kim 2005).  Thus, he reformulated the original DTT in order to account 
for the recent fertility transition to lowest-low fertility levels in Korea.  Basically, 
socioeconomic change represents one of the predominant conditions and underlying 
forces of fertility decline in the conceptual models he uses for his two fertility transitions 
(D. Kim 2005).  Based on his mechanisms of understanding these fertility transitions, the 
first fertility transition can be explained as a function of five factors: socioeconomic 
change, industrialization, urbanization (e.g., internal migration), mortality decline, and 
family planning programs (D. Kim 2005).  He has argued that “the first fertility 
transition was a joint product of socioeconomic change and the family planning 
programs” (D. Kim 2005: 20).  In the early 1960s, high educational levels, the rise of 
income, female labor force participation, and all other developmental indicators, along 
with national family planning programs, all played an important reinforcing role in 
Korea’s fertility decline.     
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However, the key concepts and the causal mechanisms of the second fertility 
transition are different from those of the first fertility transition in Korea.  Unlike the 
conceptual model of the first fertility transition, government-organized family efforts, 
migration, and mortality decline were all no longer considered to be major determinants 
of the recent fertility decline in Korea (D. Kim 2005).  Kim postulated that the “recent 
socioeconomic transformation and its accompanying changes in labor market, family 
formation, and gender equity orientation are the major underlying forces for the rapid 
decline of fertility” (D. Kim 2005: 11) in Korea since the mid 1980s.  He emphasized 
that the expansion of the global economy always brings about socioeconomic changes 
through effects on economic restructuring, labor force participation, women’s status, 
value orientation, and other conditions that affect fertility (D. Kim 2005).  More 
specifically, during the 1990s “globalization, characterized by free trade and free flows 
of capital and labor across international boundaries, resulted in labor market 
deregulation and increasing insecurity in the labor market” (D. Kim 2005: 13) in many 
Asian countries, including South Korea.  Consequently, high unemployment rates and 
unstable economic conditions at both the household and the national levels all have had 
a tremendous impact on fertility decline in Korea.  Accordingly, his underlying 
assumption of the DTT is applicable for both the first and second fertility transitions in 
South Korea.   
Choe and associates (2004) examine several causes of Korea’s low fertility trend, 
using data from the 1990 and 2000 population censuses and the 1994 and 2000 rounds of 
the national fertility survey.  These researchers then conducted cross-sectional studies 
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for the years 1994 and 2000, investigating the socioeconomic and demographic effects 
on marital fertility.  Additionally, socioeconomic and demographic effects on marriage 
were also examined in cross-sectional studies for the years 1990 and 2000.  These 
researchers hypothesized that socioeconomic variables to be important factors affecting 
both age at marriage and fertility.  More specifically, education attainment and 
urbanization were expected to increase the age at marriage and decrease the marriage 
rates that promote fertility decline.     
The results of this research showed that a demographic variable such as change 
in women’s age structure (e.g., 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34) by itself does not explain the 
increase in proportion of being never married, among women aged 20-34 in the years 
1999 and 2000.  On the other hand, socioeconomic variables such as education and 
urban residence both have effects on the probability of never being married, among 
those women in the cross-section analysis.  The researchers explained that an increase in 
education and residence in an urban area both should induce changes in values and 
norms with regards to marriage, indicating that a woman’s age at marriage could rise 
more or less simultaneously in all socioeconomic groups (Choe et al. 2004).   
Another finding shows that recorded changes in socioeconomic variables and 
demographic variables explain all of the changes in marital fertility among married 
women under age 40, throughout the 2.5-year reference period analyzed in the two 
survey years, 1994 and 2000.  Although the socioeconomic variables did not appear to 
have longitudinal effects in the model, these variables are strongly associated with the 
age of a woman at marriage and her relative marital fertility.  Accordingly, the results of 
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the analytical models indicate that socioeconomic predicators go a long way toward 
explaining cross-sectional variation in age at marriage and differences in marital fertility 
in South Korea, during the 1990s (Choe et al. 2004).   
The authors put forth copious explanations for their findings.  Socioeconomic 
changes brought about shifts in values, norms, and attitudes in Korean women about 
marriage and fertility during the 1990s (Choe et al. 2004).  In particular, important 
socioeconomic changes during the 1990s such as the Asian economic crisis and rising 
female labor force participation, were argued to be responsible for the rapid rise in age at 
marriage and the rapid fall in fertility to very low levels (Choe et al. 2004).  These 
researchers asserted that if Korea’s TFR tended to decline in response to rapid growth of 
per capita income between 1985 and 1995, its decline after 1995 can be assumed to be 
affected by the Asian economic crisis and its aftermath.  In addition, the rising female 
labor participation in non-farm occupations tended to reduce fertility between 1991 and 
2000.  This is primarily because the percentage of the female labor force’s participation 
in non-farm occupations increased from 57 to 90 percent for always-married women 
aged 30-34, and from 26 to 37 percent for currently working women aged 30-34 (Choe 
et al. 2004).             
Ik-Ki Kim (1987) investigated the socioeconomic determinants of fertility 
behavior among the three major groups of Korean married women: aged 30-34, 35-39, 
and 40-44, exploring both individual and community-level differences.  Using data from 
the 1974 Korean National Fertility Survey, the model examined several socioeconomic 
effects such as married female respondent’s education, childhood residence, working 
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experience before and after marriage, husband’s education and occupation, and current 
residence, all with regards to fertility.  These variables were also divided into two 
groups—individual-level (micro) variables and community-level variables.  Community-
level variables were comprised of two major categories—socioeconomic development 
and family planning variables.  The analytical models used both micro and macro 
components; the micro component specified that the socioeconomic conditions affected 
the individual’s fertility behavior, whereas the macro component specified that 
contextual characteristics affected the micro level relationship between socioeconomic 
indicators and fertility (I. K. Kim 1987).  In these models, three fertility-related measures 
were examined as dependent variables: age at the birth of first child, early fertility 
(number of children born before the respondent reached the age of thirty), and later 
fertility (number of children born after the respondent’s 30th birthday).   
Kim carried out two different kinds of analyses: a preliminary analysis of fertility 
differentials in both urban areas (the transitional setting) and rural areas (the traditional 
setting), and a multilevel analysis of fertility behavior.  In his first analysis, he 
hypothesized that: 1) the micro socioeconomic effects on age at first birth would be 
negative in rural areas and positive in urban areas; 2) women’s education would be 
positively associated with early fertility regardless of the social context; and 3) micro-
socioeconomic variables would be positively related to later fertility among two groups 
of older women, those aged 35-39 and 40-44, in less developed areas (I. K. Kim 1987).     
However, Kim discovered that “the effects of women’s education on age at first 
birth are positive and statistically significant for all women” (I. K. Kim 1987: 75).  In 
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contrast to his hypothesis, women’s education is negatively related to early fertility 
before the age of thirty in both urban and rural areas, but is only significant in the group 
aged 30-34 for both areas.  This result suggests that younger women with a high 
education who live in both urban and rural areas all limit their family size, even before 
they reach the age of thirty.  Also, the effects of micro-socioeconomic variables such as 
women’s education, post-marital work experience, and husband’s education on later 
fertility after the woman reaches the age of thirty are negative in both urban and rural 
areas—in particular, the effects of women’s education and post-marital work 
experiences on later fertility are significantly negative among the two older age groups.                       
Unlike the preliminary analysis, macro-socioeconomic variables, along with the 
micro level socioeconomic variables, are included in this multilevel analysis.  In the 
analysis of the woman’s age at first birth, additive macro-socioeconomic development—
the average level of education within a community and the micro-socioeconomic 
variable—yields a conclusion that a woman’s education with regards to her age at first 
birth are positive and statistically significant, all through the hypothesized and analyzed 
age groups.  This result also indicates that increases in the average level of education 
within a community would increase the woman’s age at first birth (I. K. Kim 1987).   
In the analysis of early fertility, a woman’s pre-marital work experience was not 
only expected to be associated with the socioeconomic development variables but also 
the early fertility rate before the age of 30.  The results of this researcher’s analysis show 
that the average level of education of a community has a negative effect on fertility 
among the two groups of women aged 30-34 and 35-39, and they were also statistically 
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significant.  This also indicates that an “increase in the average level of education in a 
community would decrease early fertility” (I. K. Kim 1987: 92).  On the other hand, 
women’s education and pre-marital work experiences are negatively associated with 
early fertility.  In addition, pre-marital work experience is positively related with 
socioeconomic development, as hypothesized.    
Moreover, the hypothesized relationships between the micro- and macro-
socioeconomic effects and family planning inputs, and later a woman’s fertility after age 
30, were all tested.  The results of these analytical models for later fertility show that: 1) 
the micro socioeconomic variables, such as women’s education, post-marital work 
experience, and husband’s education are negatively associated with fertility after the age 
of 30 among the two groups of women aged 35-39 and 40-44, and they were all 
statistically significant except the effects of women’s education on later fertility among 
the group of women aged 35-39; 2) the effect of a macro-socioeconomic variable such as 
the average level of education of a community and the number of general health 
facilities on later fertility is also negative and significant; and 3) the effect of the family 
planning program, such as the number of family planning workers on later fertility, is 
negative and not significant, but its effect is stronger among highly educated women. 
Consequently, most of the above findings indicate that “socioeconomic 
development results in increased age at first birth and a reduced number of children” (I. 
K. Kim 1987: 110).  For the most part, these findings support earlier studies that suggest 
that “socioeconomic development is accompanied by [a] desire [for a] smaller family 
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size, creating the conditions for fertility decline even in the absence of a national family 
planning program” (I. K. Kim 1987: 110).                      
Doo-Sub Kim (1987) has explored the relationship between fertility and 
indicators of socioeconomic status such as family income, occupation, urban residence, 
and the education of the wife and husband.  The main objective of his study was to 
investigate the socioeconomic differentials in fertility in both Korea and the United 
States, focusing on the effects of socioeconomic inequality as well as the socioeconomic 
level of the community on fertility at the macro and micro levels.  In a fertility analysis 
of Korea, he estimated various analytical models using the data sets from the Korean 
National Fertility Surveys and population censuses taken around 1975.  In this review, I 
focus on the findings of his analytical models for the effects of socioeconomic indicators 
on Korea’s fertility (rather than the aspect of socioeconomic inequality). 
Using data collected from 1,174 women in the 1974 Korean National Fertility 
Survey, Kim analyzed the socioeconomic differentials in fertility among the two groups 
of women aged 40-44 and 45-49.  He focused on the group of women aged 40 who had 
almost finished childbearing at the time of the survey, in order to reduce the direct and 
indirect effects of a woman’s age as well as of the socioeconomic events of fertility (D. 
Kim 1987).   
In previous empirical studies, “particularly in societies in the period of transition 
from high to low fertility, a more or less negative correlation of fertility to 
socioeconomic status has been found: the higher socioeconomic status groups having 
lower fertility” (D. Kim 1987: 6).  Korea’s fertility has been found to be negatively 
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related to a woman’s education, in both rural and urban areas and for all the time periods 
for which data were available (Cho et al. 1982).  The women who have attained a higher 
educational level are more likely to innovate in fertility control which, consequently, 
results in lower fertility (Entwisle et al. 1982).  In addition, women’s work experience in 
non-farm related occupations has had a negative effect on fertility due to a role 
incompatibility, as well as due to greater exposure to more modern ideas and 
information about birth control.  The effect of place of residence on fertility has also 
been widely examined in the study of fertility differentials and found to be negative in 
urban (more than rural) areas. 
Kim’s findings tend to support these early Korean fertility studies, showing that 
the macro- and micro-socioeconomic variables are negatively associated with fertility.  
The relationship between education and the number of children ever born is found to be 
most straightforward in his study.  He has found a clearly negative relationship between 
individual education and fertility in the more urbanized areas, but less so in the less 
urbanized areas.  He believes that younger women are likely to have a lower fertility 
because they tend to have received more education and marry at an older age (D. Kim 
1987).   
Another finding he observed was that women whose husbands are agricultural 
workers have markedly high fertility, whereas those whose husbands are professional, 
managerial and clerical workers have the lowest levels of fertility.  Some pertinent 
studies have also found that “professionals and managers were distinctive for their high 
level of contraceptive use, while farmers and manual laborers were distinctive for their 
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low level of use” (Cho et al. 1982: 62).  These findings indicate that “as Korea’s 
economy continues its industrial transformation and Korean men and women shift to 
jobs with higher occupational prestige, continuing fertility decline will be favored” (Cho 
et al. 1982: 62).          
As one would expect, family income tends to be negatively related to fertility.  
Kim discovered that an expected family income and the index of family income are 
negatively associated with the number of children born.  Moreover, expected family 
income is highly correlated with educational and occupational variables, indicating that 
those who expected a relatively high level of income have a higher educational level and 
more professional experience.   
In addition, the effects of residence on the number of children born also appear to 
be influential in these models.  Women in urban areas have fewer children than those in 
rural areas, suggesting that the fertility level is lower in urban areas than in rural areas.  
Interestingly, the effect of religion is also examined in his models, but was not found to 
be a significant factor.  However, the results indicate that “Catholics show the highest 
fertility, and Protestants, the lowest” (D. Kim 1987: 91).      
In sum, the age of women, as well as other socioeconomic covariates such as 
family income, the education level of the couple, and the husband’s occupation all 
turned out to be highly significant in explaining a variation in the number of children 
born (D. Kim 1987).  Consequently, Kim’s findings appear to correspond with earlier 
studies showing that micro-socioeconomic variables are negatively associated with 
Korea’s fertility in the study.        
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Furthermore, Kim discovered that women in the community with higher levels of 
household income, educational attainment and occupational prestige are likely to have 
fewer children.  In his macro-level analysis, the mean number of children of a 
community was found to be negatively associated with the socioeconomic status of that 
community.  He also found that the socioeconomic inequality of the community has a 
positive effect on fertility, while the socioeconomic level of the community has a 
negative effect on fertility.  He brought up the idea that the “socioeconomic structure of 
the community develops certain norms and values, which permit and prescribe 
individual decision making on fertility” (D. Kim 1987: 108).     
Most of these findings are consistent with earlier studies.  Consequently, fertility 
is affected not only by the socioeconomic status of individuals (at the micro-level) but 
also by the socioeconomic characteristics of the community (at the macro-level) in 
which they live.    
In this chapter, the DTT and previous studies of Korean fertility have been 
reviewed.  These theoretical and empirical studies have contributed to the understanding 
of the relationship between socioeconomic indicators and fertility.  Building on these 
studies, this thesis will examine the relationship between socioeconomic predictors and 
fertility rates of the counties in South Korea.  Also, the effects of other considerable 
factors, including the status of women and cultural norms on fertility will be examined in 
this research.  The next chapter will describe the data and methodology to be used in the 
research.          
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
Chapter III introduces the sources of data and discusses the analytical techniques 
to be employed in this thesis.  Prior to elaborating on the data and methodology, the 
research hypotheses of this study will briefly be discussed.  In addition, the 
operationalization of the independent and dependent variables specified in the 
hypotheses will be described in this chapter.        
Hypotheses 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, socioeconomic characteristic are expected 
to be negatively associated with fertility among the counties of Korea, and positively 
related to each other.  In this analysis, three variables, namely, agricultural population, 
labor force participation, and educational attainment are used to measure the 
socioeconomic conditions of the Korean counties.  The specific hypotheses for these 
three variables are as follows: among the 231 Korean counties, 1) the percentage of the 
population in agriculture should be positively related to fertility; 2) the labor force 
participation rate should be negatively related to fertility; and 3) educational attainment 
should be negatively related to fertility.   
In recent studies, women’s status has been considered to have an important effect 
on fertility, “since Korea has experienced substantial improvements in gender equity 
during the past two decades” (D. Kim 2005: 16).  “Increasing trends in gender equity in 
education and market employment, and extended control over childbearing by women 
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are responsible for the fertility decline from low levels to very low levels during the past 
two decades in Korea” (D. Kim 2005: 17).   
Thus, this thesis postulates that the status of women should be negatively 
associated with fertility.  The specific hypotheses for the two female status variables are 
as follows: among the 231 Korean counties, 4) gender equity in educational attainment 
should be negatively related to fertility, and 5) female labor force participation should be 
negatively related to fertility.  In other words, Korean women who have a higher 
educational attainment and more economic capability for self-support should tend to 
postpone or avoid having children (D. Kim 2005).      
Recent findings also suggest that the changing traditional and cultural value 
orientations of families have resulted in an increasing incidence of divorce and a rise in 
the age at marriage for both men and women that, consequently, led to the fertility 
decline in Korea.  Undoubtedly, “decreased family formation and increased family 
dissolution have been key factors of current fertility decline in Korea” (D. Kim 2005: 
16).   
During the 1990s, socioeconomic changes and the improved social status of 
women have contributed substantially to the decrease in the proportion of married 
couples and the increase in marriage dissolution.  Since the nationwide economic crisis 
in 1997, it has been suggested that economic hardships trigger both a decrease in the 
marriage rate and an increase in the divorce rate.  In particular, “the lack of stable jobs 
for young men has been an important reason for remaining single since the mid 1990s—
decreasing confidence about their future employment prospects has kept young people 
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from their entry to marriage and reproduction” (D. Kim 2005: 15).  At the same time, 
employment practices guaranteeing jobs until statuary retirement age have been 
disappearing, so many workers have had to quit working before reaching retirement age 
(D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  As a result of the unstable national economy and labor 
market insecurity, financial problems have often led to the divorce of couples with latent 
conflicts that accumulated over the course of their marriage (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).       
Accordingly, these trends toward delayed marriage and an increasing incidence 
of divorce have been brought about by a confluence of interrelated socioeconomic and 
cultural changes.  These changes include educational attainment for women, a rapid 
increase in female labor force participation, major changes in the structure and function 
of the marriage market, an extraordinary increase in premarital sex, and far-reaching 
changes in marriage and traditional family values (Retherford et al. 2001).      
In addition, a preference for male children has long been considered to have an 
effect on fertility behavior among Korean women.  Under the Confucian system of the 
traditional patriarchal family, a male child was seen as crucial for carrying on the family 
name, for the rituals of ancestor worship, and for inheritance purposes in Korean society 
(Cho et al. 1982).  On the other hand, the birth of a daughter was considered to be an 
unfortunate event, and women who could not bear a son could be expelled from the 
family.  Nowadays, this traditional practice has disappeared, due to several factors such 
as socioeconomic changes, westernization, urbanization, and gender equity.  Although a 
preference for male children has begun to lose the hold it had previously in Korean 
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society during the last two decades, “there is no doubt that the majority of Koreans 
maintain their traditional values on this subject” (Cho et al. 1982: 121). 
However, several empirical studies have shown that son-selective reproduction 
behaviors raise the sex ratio at birth (SRB) and, at the same time, play a role in lowering 
the level of fertility in Korea, in contrast to an earlier proposition that stated that a strong 
preference for male children might provide a major obstacle to an attainment of low 
fertility (Park 1983; Arnold 1985).  Nonetheless, in accordance with the fertility decline, 
the SRB is presently approaching its normal condition—it declined to 108.2 in 2004 
from a peak of 116.5 in 1990.     
While some demographers argue that son preference does not account much for 
the current low level of fertility, a preference for male children still plays an important 
role in determining the fertility behavior of Korean women.  Particularly in Korea, rural 
residents or members of the older generations tend to have a strong preference for sons, 
as compared to their urban and younger counterparts.  Koo (1979) has found that a 
preference for sons had a significant effect on fertility among the older urban residents, 
while any effect of preference for male children on the desire for more children in 
general was not found among young, low-parity women (Cho et al. 1982).  Mostly, the 
effect of son preference on fertility is considered to be negligible among young Korean 
women.  Doo-Sub Kim (2005) explains that “young couples are now less likely than the 
older generation to accept the ideology of patriarchy and traditional gender roles and, as 
a result, their attitudinal and behavioral expressions of the desired number of children 
and son preference are getting lower than ever” (D. Kim 2005: 17).  
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But since there has not been extensive research on the effects of son preference 
on current fertility levels in Korea, son preference (as a cultural norm indicator) will be 
examined as one of the independent variables in this research, representing overall 
traditional and cultural values. 
Overall, traditional family norms and cultural values are hypothesized to be 
positively associated with fertility.  More specifically, among the 231 Korean counties, 
6) the marriage rate should be positively related to fertility; 7) the sex ratio at birth 
should be positively related to fertility; and 8) the divorce rate should be negatively 
related to fertility.   
Operationalization 
This thesis will analyze one dependent variable: the general fertility rate (GFR).  
The GFR represents the annual number of births in a given population per 1,000 women 
aged 15-49, and is calculated: (total number of live births to women ÷ the number of 
women aged 15-49) × 1000.  In this analysis, the GFR is used to measure Korean 
fertility, indicating a ratio of the number of live births per 1,000 women in the age group 
between 15 and 49, in each the 231 counties in South Korea in 2004.       
Generally, three measures of fertility are used in most fertility studies: the crude 
birth rate (CBR), the general fertility rate (GFR), and the total fertility rate (TFR).  
Although the CBR is the most easily obtained, the GFR and TFR are more commonly 
used over the CBR, since they are more statistically refined.  On the other hand, the GFR 
may not be comparable across time or place if one population has a high proportion of 
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women in the most fecund period because this measure does not account for age-related 
fertility fluctuations.  In this case, the TFR is preferred over the GFR.   
However, over the last decades, the average age at first marriage has increased 
for both men and women in South Korea.  The trend toward delaying or avoiding 
marriage, as well as the increase in early divorces and re-marriage (especially among 
those aged 37-42) are, consequently, contributing to an increase in the mean age at first 
birth.  Under these circumstances, I am confident that the GFR is a suitable measure of 
Korean fertility in this study.     
 In this analysis, eight independent variables are employed.  All of these variables 
concern the 231 counties of South Korea in the years 2000 and 2004.    
 Three variables measure the level of socioeconomic development among the 
counties in Korea—the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture, the 
percentage of the population in the labor force above 15 years of age, and the percentage 
of the population aged 25 and over who attain above a university degree.  As mentioned 
earlier, all socioeconomic predictors are expected to be negatively related to fertility.  
But these variables are positively associated with each other.  For example, urban areas 
have higher levels of educational attainment and higher labor force participation rates 
than rural areas.         
1) Agricultural population 
The rapid process of urbanization has been one of the most significant 
socioeconomic effects on the fertility decline in Korea.  The urbanization rate increased 
from 29 percent in 1960 to 81.9 percent in 2000, while the fertility rate has drastically 
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declined.  Thus, in this thesis, the percentage of the agricultural population measures the 
degree of urbanization in each county.  As mentioned in hypothesis, the percentage of 
the population engaged in agriculture tends to be positively related to fertility.  Here is 
its operationalization: (the population that is employed in agricultural related work ÷ 
total population) × 100.     
2) Labor force participation 
In accordance with the rapid economic development that has occurred since the 
early 1960s, the labor force participation rate has increased from 55.3 percent in 1960 to 
62 percent in 1995.  However, it decreased to 60.7 percent in 1998 due to a national 
financial crisis that yielded high unemployment rates, but it went up again to 62 percent 
in 2004 after the recovery from the economic recession.  In sum, a steady increase in the 
labor force participation rate (economic development) has proceeded along with the 
fertility decline in Korea.  Thus, the percentage of the population in the labor force 
(employed, self-employed or unemployed above 15 years of age) is anticipated to be 
negatively related to fertility.  In other words, a higher percentage of the population in 
the labor force is linked to a lower fertility rate.  This variable will be measured as 
follows: (the population in labor force ÷ total population (age 15+)) × 100.        
3) Educational attainment   
Educational level, together with socioeconomic development has improved in 
Korea.  “Since the early 1980s, the enrollment rate in elementary school has been almost 
100 percent and the advancement rates from one level of school to a higher level has 
considerably increased” (Cho and Lee 1999: 29).  According to the Korea National 
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Statistical Office (KNSO), the proportion of people aged 20 or over who have graduated 
from high school or higher, of the total population aged 20 or over, increased from 18.1 
percent in 1970 to 63 percent in 1995 (Cho and Lee 1999).  This substantial 
improvement in education has been considered to be one of the most significant effects 
on fertility in Korea.  In this thesis, the percentage of the population aged 25 and over 
attaining above a university degree is usually employed, and therefore expected to be 
negatively associated with the GFR.  It will be operationalized as: (the population 
attaining above university degree ÷ total population (age 25+)) × 100.      
Two variables will be used to measure the status of women in this thesis—gender 
equity in educational attainment, and female labor force population, both of which are 
expected to be negatively associated with fertility.       
4) Gender equality in education  
There has for a long time been a gap in educational attainment between women 
and men in Korea.  “The average years of educational attainment in 1995 was 9.4 years 
for females and 11.2 years for males, a difference of 1.8 years between the sexes” (Cho 
and Lee 1999: 85).  However, according to the KNSO, the female to male ratio for high 
school graduation or higher for ages 20 - 24 was 86.4 percent in 1985 and 101.4 percent 
in 1995, which marks a significant increase from 53.8 percent in 1970.  On the other 
hand, “the female to male ratio for college graduation or higher for ages 25~29 was 38.9 
percent in 1970, but increased to 55.5 percent in 1985 and 85.5 percent in 1995” (Cho 
and Lee 1999: 86).  Although gender inequality in education attainment at the university 
level or higher still remains, during the past two decades there has been substantial 
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progress in reducing educational discrimination against Korean women.  Consequently, 
gender equity in education improves women’s social status, affecting Korean women’s 
fertility.  In this analysis, the ratio of the percentage of male educational attainment to 
the percentage of female educational attainment above a university degree measures a 
woman’s status, which is anticipated to be negatively related to the GFR.  Specifically, 
here is the ratio: the male education attainment above university degree (age 25+) ÷ the 
female education attainment above university degree (age 25+).       
5) Female labor force participation 
Gender discrimination in labor opportunities, as well as education, has declined.  
Consequently, this enhances Korean women’s social status.  Since 1960, an increase of 
women in the labor force has been considered to have a significant effect on fertility 
decline in Korea.  The participation of women in the labor force gradually increased 
from 40.5 percent 1981 to 59.8 percent in 1998 for married women, while the TFR 
decreased from 2.66 to 1.47.  In this thesis, the percentage of the female labor population 
aged 15 and over, a statistic used to measure women’s social status, is anticipated to be 
related to the GFR, and will be measured as: (the female population in labor force ÷ total 
female population (age 15+)) × 100.   
Regarding traditional family norms and cultural values, three variables will be 
used, namely, the sex ratio at birth, the marriage rate, and the divorce rate; they are 
expected to be associated with fertility.  As detailed in the hypotheses, a gradual 
disappearance of traditional and cultural norms caused by rapid socioeconomic changes 
has had a tremendous impact on Korea’s fertility.    
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6) Marriage  
A continuous decrease in the rate of marriage has been observed during the past 
two decades in Korea.  By 1980, the marriage rate began to decrease.  It declined from a 
peak of 10.6 per 1,000 persons in 1980 to 7.0 in 2000.  “With rapid changes in family 
values encompassing sexuality, marriage, children, divorce, and remarriage, young 
people are raising questions about the necessity of marriage” (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004: 
151).  Between 1990 and 2000 the proportion of single women aged 25-29 increased by 
18.0 percent and the proportion of single women aged 30-34 increased by 5.4 percent (D. 
Kim and C. Kim 2004).  In addition, both the age at first marriage and the age at first 
birth increased; the mean age at first marriage was 30.1 and 27.3 years, for men and 
women respectively, in 2003, which is an increase of 2.0 years for men and 2.2 years for 
women, from 1993 (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004); the mean age of women at first birth rose 
from 26.3 years in 1993 to 28.6 years in 2003 (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  These 
changes in the culture of marriage corresponded to changes in fertility in Korea.  In this 
analysis, the marriage rate per 1,000 Koreans over the age of 25 is expected to be 
positively related to the GFR.  It will be operationalized as: (the number of marriage ÷ 
total population (age 25+)) × 1,000.  
7) Divorce 
Since 1960, the level of divorce has rapidly increased in response to the fertility 
decline in Korea; the divorce rate remarkably increased from 0.3 per 1,000 persons in 
1960 to 2.5 in 2000.  The increase in the divorce rate continued and reached 3.5 in 2003; 
this is its highest level in modern Korean history.  According to the KNSO, financial 
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problems have emerged as a major reason for the rapid increase in divorce in 2000.  
Financial problems as a self-reported reason for divorce accounted for 2.0 percent of the 
total divorces in 1990, but jumped to 10.7 percent in 2000 (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  
However, regardless of the economic crisis in 1997, “changes in family and marriage 
values have been taking place over a long period of time” (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  
Therefore in this thesis, the divorce rate per 1,000 Koreans over the age of 25 represents 
the opposite of traditional family norms and cultural values and is anticipated to be 
negatively related to the GFR.  It is measured as follows: (the number of divorces ÷ total 
population (age 25+)) × 1,000.    
8) Son preference 
“South Korea (along with China and Taiwan) has a Confucian patriarchal 
tradition where son preference is strong and pervasive” (Poston et al. 2003: 50).  A 
strong preference for sons over daughters is a part of Korean culture that has maintained 
imbalances of the sex ratio at birth (SRB) in Korean society (Poston et al. 1997).  One 
indicator of son preference is the reported SRB.  A normal sex ratio at birth is around 
105, meaning 105 boys are born for every 100 girls.  However, the Korean SRB has 
been on the rise from 109 to 116 boys per 100 girls between 1985 and 2000, which is 
significantly above normal levels.  After 2000, the Korean SRB dropped below 110, but 
was still higher than the normal value of 105.  Interestingly, despite a rapid fertility 
decline during the past two decades, Korea maintained an abnormally high SRB.  In 
terms of this imbalance in the SRB, “sex-selective abortion is believed to be a principal 
intervention leading to the higher than normal SRB” (Poston et al. 2003: 48).  Due to 
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this technology, Korea’s fertility has declined with its high SRB, but the deeply-rooted 
cultural influences of son preference still make it important for Korean women to make 
their own fertility decisions.  In this analysis, the SRB measures a traditional and cultural 
norm which is expected to be positively related to fertility rates, and is represented as: 
(the number of male live births ÷ the number of female live births) × 100.   
Data 
 The principal data source for this thesis is the Korean Statistical Information 
System (KOSIS), which is a program of the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO).  
KOSIS is an online statistical database that provides a wide range of domestic and 
international statistical data in long-term series delineated by month, quarter, and year.  
Most data for this thesis are derived from 2004 Korean vital statistics and the 2000 
Population and Housing Census of Korea, both of which are available through KOSIS.  
All these data are taken from the Korean vital and civil registration systems, and are 
provided for each province, municipality, and county.  This analysis uses county-level 
data to measure the dependent variable and independent variables.  
Korean vital statistics collected in 2004 provide detailed vital statistics on births, 
deaths, marriages and divorces, including the resident registration population by sex and 
five-year age groups, the number of children born categorized by sex and the number of 
marriages and divorces for all 256 counties.  The data for the dependent variable, i.e., the 
general fertility rate (GFR), and the three independent variables such as the sex ratio at 
birth, the marriage rate, and the divorce rate used in this analysis are all derived from the 
2004 Korean vital statistics.    
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Vital statistics in modern form were first compiled in Korea in 1910.  However, 
early vital statistics were not reliable until the 1980s due to a delayed registration of vital 
events, problems associated with the general use of the lunar calendar, and the 
inconvenience of obtaining certificates of cause of death from a medical doctor (Cho et 
al. 1982).  As the vital registration system gradually improved over the two decades 
between 1960 and 1980, “delayed registration of births and deaths became much less 
frequent, and the general public became more cooperative” (Cho et al. 1982: 25).   
While Korea’s vital statistics have data limitations, the KNSO, in recent years, 
has developed other types of demographic statistics such as methods for censuses and 
survey data.  Consequently, “there are now more than enough data to make analysis of 
fertility and family planning behavior possible” (Cho et al. 1982: 31).  Since most 
Korean censuses are not available at the county level, this is another data limitation.  
Thus, I will use data from an additional census, the 2000 Population and Housing 
Census of Korea.   
As in many other countries, the Korean population censuses were conducted 
based on four basic principles, namely, individual enumeration, universality within a 
defined territory, simultaneity, and defined periodicity (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  
Generally, the Korean population census “defines an individual household as a survey 
unit and enumerates the characteristics of each individual in the household within the 
territory of Korea, with a given time reference (November 1) of every five years” (D. 
Kim and C. Kim 2004: 34).   
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Census 2000 was the latest census conducted by the KNSO.  This census covered 
50 items, 29 of which addressed population-related information and 21 of which 
addressed household and housing-related information.  While the basic items such as 
name, sex, age, relationship to the head of household, marital status, and educational 
attainment were asked for all households, questions other than basic items were asked 
only of 10 percent of the sampled households (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  For example, 
in the 2000 census the items of total labor force participation, as well as female labor 
force participation, were surveyed for only 10 percent of the sampled households.   
Labor force population has been measured in several ways in the Korean census.  
Generally, the usual approach has been to measure the status of economic activity by 
asking about activities over a longer duration of, for example, one year.  However, 
Census 2000 used ‘the labor force approach’ for its economic activity survey, measuring 
the status of economic activity by asking about activity during a relatively shorter period 
of one week or one day (D. Kim and C. Kim 2004).  The economic activity survey in the 
2000 census included items on economic activity status, seeking jobs for the reference 
period, and whether or not job seekers were currently available for work (D. Kim and C. 
Kim, 2004).                 
Census 2000 includes useful data for several independent variables for this thesis, 
namely, the percentage of the population in the total labor force, as well as the female 
labor population, the percentage of the population in agriculture, and the population by 
age, sex, and educational attainment.  Census 2000 contains various reliable data, but 
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data for 25 counties are not available for the above variables.  Thus, I will restrict my 
analysis in this thesis to 231 counties.  
All data used in this thesis are collected by the “si,” “gun,” and “gu” county units 
of seven municipalities and nine provinces in South Korea.  Although Korean population 
statistics and censuses include a wide range of data, most of them do not have 
information available at the county level.  For instance, age-specific birth rates are not 
available at the county level, whereas they are available at both the province and country 
levels through KOSIS.  Due to this data limitation, in this thesis I will use the general 
fertility rate as a measure of the average number of children in each county.    
As mentioned earlier, socioeconomic predictors are expected to have important 
effects on the fertility decline in Korea.  Given this hypothesis, income levels would be 
important socioeconomic indicators.  However, unfortunately, income data have not 
been available in most Korean censuses.  In the 1990 census, a household income 
question was included for the first time in the questionnaire, but the income data 
collected were not published due to inaccuracies in their representation (D. Kim and C. 
Kim 2004).  In addition, women’s income and occupation (e.g., occupational prestige) 
can be measures of women’s status, which has a significant impact on fertility.  But due 
to data unavailability, this thesis instead measures female labor force participation and 
gender equity in educational attainment between males and females to determine the 
status of women. 
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Methods 
In this thesis I will estimate a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression models.  Before conducting the OLS analyses, several diagnostics steps will 
be taken in order to ensure statistical accuracy in the models.  Firstly, I will attend to the 
normality assumption by evaluating the distribution of dependent and independent 
variables.  All the variables in the regression equation do not have to be normally 
distributed, but skewed Y and/or X distributions of the result in non-normal error 
distributions that produce some form of bias in the results (Hamilton 1992).  If the 
skewness exceeds 0.8 in absolute value, the distribution is considered to be skewed and 
needs to be modified.  Also, comparing the mean and median values for each variable 
indicates whether or not the distribution of the variable is skewed.  If the value of the 
mean is higher than that of the median, then the distribution is skewed right.  To the 
contrary, if the median has a higher value than the mean, then the distribution is skewed 
left.  Thus, if any variable is found to be greatly skewed, it will be modified by using 
power transformations that make the variable distributions more symmetrical.  As 
Hamilton notes, “skew can often be reduced, and outliers pulled in, by power 
transformations” (Hamilton 1992: 17).  Secondly, many independent variables will 
likely be correlated with each other, leading to problems of multicolinearity.  When 
multicolinearity becomes extreme, serious estimation problems occur; the parameter 
estimates become unreliable.   In order to check for the existence of multicolinearity 
among variables, I will estimate the zero-order correlation of the independent variables 
with the dependent variables, and with each other.  Additionally, scatterplots of each 
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bivariate relationship will be examined to see the visual representation of the positive 
and negative correlations among these variables.  These scatterplots are basic tools for 
understanding the relationship between two measurement variables, and several 
examinations for heteroscedasticity, multi-colinearity, and curvilinearity can be observed.      
After estimating the OLS regression models, I will use another diagnostic 
method.  I will examine the tolerance values of the independent variables in the 
regression model, in order to determine if the multi-colinearity is too extreme.  If the 
tolerance value for any independent variable is under 0.35, the regression equation 
should be modified.  Furthermore, if many of the independent variables are collinear 
with each other, I will consider splitting my analysis into several OLS models.   
Additionally, I will also apply two diagnostic methods such as “Model 
Diagnostics” and “Effect Diagnostics.”  DFITS (a combination of leverage score and 
studentized residuals) and DFBETAs will both be employed to determine if the 
regression model and the regression effects are being unduly influenced by certain 
observations.        
Finally, I will test the validity of the OLS results by using a Robust Regression.  
“The prevalence and broad consequences of outliers make them a major problem for 
OLS and related methods” (Hamilton 1992: 189).  Robust methods provide alternatives 
to OLS for dealing with nonnormal errors, heteroscedasticity, and curvilinearity 
(Hamilton 1992).  If the OLS and the robust methods have consistent estimations, then I 
will rely more directly on the OLS results.  On the other hand, if there are any 
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discrepancies between OLS and robust estimates of the regression coefficients and 
standard errors, I will depend more heavily on the robust regression results.   
In sum, Chapter III describes the data source and statistical methods, including 
the research hypotheses and the operationalization of nine variables used in this thesis.  
In the analysis, this thesis expects to find that counties with a lower percentage of the 
population in agriculture, a higher percentage of total population in labor force, a higher 
percentage of the population aged 25 and over attaining above a university degree, a 
higher percentage of the female labor population, a lower ratio of the percentage of male 
educational attainment to the percentage of female educational attainment above a 
university degree, a lower marriage rate, a higher divorce rate, and a lower sex ratio at 
birth have lower fertility rates.           
The following chapter will provide a detailed description of the dependent and 
independent variables.       
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION 
Chapter IV is a description of the dependent variable and eight independent 
variables to be employed in the analytical models, providing a foundation for the 
hypotheses to be tested in this thesis.  Specifically, it will provide data on the mean, 
standard deviation, range, and minimum and maximum values for each variable.  Each 
variable will then be discussed.  According to descriptive data on each variable, specific 
counties (the units of analysis) will be identified and discussed geographically, culturally, 
and socio-economically.   
South Korea is subdivided into the seven independent municipalities of Seoul 
(the capital city of Korea), Pusan, Daegu, Inchon, Kwangju, Daejon, and Ulsan, and the 
nine provinces of Kyunggi-do, Kangwon-do, Chungchongbuk-do, Chungchongnam-do, 
Chollabuk-do, Chollanam-do, Kyongsangbuk-do, Kyongsangnam-do, and Cheju-do, for 
a total of sixteen separate and geographically exclusive subdivisions.  These major 
subdivisions are shown in the map (see FIGURE 3).  Given that most of the 
independent municipalities contain a population number equivalent to that of the 
provinces, in this thesis seven municipalities are considered to be province equivalents.        
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 2004 Korean vital statistics list 
contains detailed vital statistics for all 256 county equivalents, i.e., the “si,” “gun,” and 
“gu” units.  But since the 2000 census, which is also used in this analysis, does not 
provide data for 25 of the counties included in the 2004 vital statistics, 231 Korean 
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county equivalents of the seven municipalities and nine provinces will be the units of 
analysis used in this thesis.   
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the general fertility rate (GFR).  The GFR is the 
number of live births per 1,000 women aged 15-49 years.  According to 2004 Korean 
vital statistics, South Korea’s GFR is 34.72, which is equivalent to a TFR level of 1.04.  
The GFR among the provinces and municipalities of Korea ranges from a low of 26.32 
in the Pusan municipality to a high of 40.63 in Cheju-do province.  This GFR range is 
equivalent to a TFR range of .79 to 1.22.  However, there is slightly more variability 
among the counties than in the provinces; the mean GFR among the 231 counties is 
34.36 (SD 6.50), ranging from a low of 21.6 in Gangseo-gu (in the Pusan municipality) 
to a high of 54.31 in Hwacheon-gun (in the Kangwon-do province) (see TABLE 1).  
This GFR range is equivalent to a TFR range of .6 to 1.62.  Not surprisingly, both 
provinces and counties vary in their GFR, but the high GFR values are very low.  This 
indicates that by and large, Korea’s fertility rate is extremely low all across the country.           
The six counties with the lowest GFRs are all located in the Pusan 
municipality—namely, Seo-gu, Dong-gu, Yeongdo-gu, Dongnae-gu, Geumjeong-gu, 
and Gangseo-gu counties.  These GFRs are equal to TFRs less than 1.0.  The Pusan 
municipality, which houses 16 counties, contains the third largest population after the 
Seoul municipality and the Kyunggi-do province, and is one of the most 
socioeconomically and culturally developed areas in South Korea.  Additionally, 
Gangnam-gu county (in the Seoul municipality), where the consumer price index for 
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living necessities is the highest in Korea, also has the lowest GFR.  Given that most of 
the seven municipalities are urbanized and advanced in the way of socioeconomic 
development, more than even the provinces, it is not surprising that most counties with 
the lowest GFRs are found in these municipalities.  This also supports the negative 
relationship between socioeconomic development and fertility, based on demographic 
transition theory as discussed in previous chapters.                       
The eight counties with the highest GFRs are found in four provinces: 
Hwacheon-gun, Yanggu-gun, and Inje-gun counties (in Kangwon-do province), 
Hwasun-gun and Yeongam-gun counties (in Chollanam-do province), Chilgok-gun 
county (in Kyongsangbuk-do province), and Jinhae-si and Geoje-si counties (in 
Kyongsangnam-do province).  Kangwon-do province is mostly a mountainous or rural 
area which, comparatively, has the smallest population in Korea.  In addition, 
Chollanam-do, Kyongsangbuk-do, and Kyongsangnam-do provinces have the highest 
agricultural populations in the country.      
Independent Variables 
 Three independent variables indicate the socioeconomic conditions of the 
counties of Korea.  Firstly, the percentage of the total population engaged in agriculture-
related work has a mean value of 21.31 (SD 20.49) among the counties of Korea (see 
TABLE 1), with a low of 0.0 in 25 counties in the three municipalities of Seoul, Pusan, 
and Incheon, and a high of 67.1 in Sinangun, a county in Chollanam-do province.  This 
indicates that among the 231 counties, only 21.26 percent of the total population is 
employed in agriculture-related work.  As expected, most municipalities (which are 
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considered to be urbanized and economically developed) have the lowest percentage of 
agricultural population.  In the case of the Seoul municipality, 18 of the 25 counties have 
0.0 percent agricultural population, indicating that, overall, less than one percent of the 
population in Seoul is employed in agriculture-related work.  As mentioned before, the 
Seoul municipality is the capital of Korea and, as such, the center of government, 
economy, and culture.  The per capita GDP of Seoul is much higher than that any of the 
other provinces and municipalities in Korea.  Dong-gu, a county in the Incheon 
municipality, also has a 0.0 percent level of agricultural population.  The Incheon 
municipality is located in the suburbs of the Seoul municipality, and also has, relatively, 
the highest GDP size.  By and large, only 8.8 percent of the total population in the 
Incheon municipality is engaged in agriculture-related work.  Moreover, six counties 
such as Jung-gu, Dong-gu, Yeongdo-gu, Busanjin-gu, Nam-gu, and Suyeong-gu 
counties in the Pusan municipality have 0.0 percent agricultural population.  As shown 
before, these six counties (in the Pusan municipality) are the counties with the lowest 
GFRs, which are less than a TFR level of 1.0.  This also supports the hypothesis of this 
thesis that the percentage of the population employed in agricultural related work is 
negatively related to fertility.                       
The seven counties with the highest percentage of agricultural population are 
located in two provinces, Chollabuk-do and Chollanam-do.  These two provinces contain 
a large proportion of the total agricultural area, as well as a large number of farming 
households.  Chollabuk-do province houses four counties all with the highest 
agricultural population: Jinan-gun, Jangsu-gun, Imsil-gun, and the Sunchang-gun.  
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Chollanam-do province houses three counties: Damyang-gun, Hampyeong-gun, and the 
Sinan-gun.  Unlike the seven municipalities, the nine provinces all report annual farm 
household income, indicating that the provinces overwhelmingly contain a higher 
percentage of the population engaged in agriculture-related work over that of the 
municipalities.        
The second socioeconomic indicator is the percentage of total population in the 
labor force, which has a mean value of 57.39 (SD 6.71).  This indicates that among the 
counties of Korea, 57.39 percent of the total population is engaged in the labor force or 
are seeking a job.  The variability of the percentage of labor force participation ranges 
from a low of 43.4 in Dong-gu, a county in the Kwangju municipality, to a high of 77.7 
in Sinan-gun, a county in Chollanam-do province.  Interestingly, in contrast to the 
supposition that the labor force participation rate should be higher in the municipalities 
than in the provinces, the nine counties with the lowest percentage of the population in 
the labor force are all located in four municipalities: Seo-gu, Yeongdo-gu, Dongnae-gu, 
and Suyeong-gu counties (in the Pusan municipality), Jung-gu and Suseong-gu counties 
(in the Daegu municipality), Dong-gu, Nam-gu, and Buk-gu counties (in the Kwangju 
municipality), and Dong-gu county (in the Daejon municipality).   
On the other hand, the ten counties with the highest percentage of their 
population in the labor force are all located in four provinces: Jangsu-gun and Sunchang-
gun counties (in the Chollabuk-do province), Goheung-gun, Haenam-gun, Jindo-gun, 
and Sinan-gun counties (in the Chollanam-do province), Gunwi-gun, Uiseong-gun, and 
Seongju-gun counties (in the Kyongsangbuk-do province), and Namjeju-gun county (in 
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the Cheju-do province).  These ten counties with the highest percentage of labor force 
participation also contain a high percentage of agricultural population.  Given that three 
of the provinces, Chollabuk-do, Chollanam-do, and the Kyongsangbuk-do, but not 
Cheju-do (which has a much larger area of cultivated land than the seven municipalities), 
cover the largest areas of cultivated land in Korea, labor force participation in these ten 
counties is assumed to be mainly concentrated in agriculture.  Since Korean agricultural 
industries are concentrated in these provinces, four provinces have a high total income 
stemming from agriculture.  On the contrary, non-agricultural industries such as those in 
service and finance tend to centralize in the municipalities.  Consequently, the 
unemployment rates in the municipalities are higher than those in the provinces, 
indicating that there is likely a more intensive level of job competitiveness (mostly for 
white collar jobs) in municipalities than in provinces.  This circumstance best explains 
why the counties with a lofty percentage of agricultural population also have a high 
percentage of labor force participation.      
The last socioeconomic variable is the percentage of the population with above a 
university degree.  The mean value for total educational attainment is 10.63 (SD 7.00), 
which means that, on average, 10.63 percent of the population in the Korean counties 
aged 25 and over have at least a university degree.  The range of educational attainment 
fluctuates from a low of 1.96 percent in Sinan-gun, a county in the Chollanam-do 
province, to a high of 42.24 in Gangnam-gu, a county in the Seoul municipality.  As 
expected, the Seoul municipality has the highest percentage of its population attaining 
above a university degree.  In particular, Gangnam-gu and Seocho-gu counties (in Seoul) 
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have become known as a special education zone for the whole country, since many 
young parents with high incomes and a passion for education concentrate in these 
counties which, in turn, leads to an overflow of educational product.  Furthermore, these 
two counties display one of the lowest fertility rates among the counties of Korea, which 
highly supports the theoretical statements presented earlier in this thesis.  On the 
contrary, Sinan-gun county (in the Chollanam-do province) with the highest agricultural 
population and labor force participation in agriculture-related works has the lowest 
percentage of educational attainment above a university degree.   
The other counties with lofty percentages of educational attainment are mostly 
located in the Seoul municipality and Kyunggi-do province.  Namely, Dongjak-gu 
county, where most educational institutes and preparatory schools are concentrated, and 
Secho-gu, Gangnam-gu, and Songpa-gu counties, which are socially, culturally, and 
economically advanced areas, have a high percentage of educational attainment.  All of 
these counties belong to the Seoul municipality.  Additionally, Gwacheon-si, Goyang-si, 
and Seongnam-si counties, which are all located in Kyunggi-do province, also display a 
high percentage of educational attainment.  Particularly, these three counties are new 
suburban areas developed for the express purpose of alleviating the concentration of 
population in the Seoul municipality.  Counties with the highest percentage of 
educational attainment have a small population engaged in agriculture, which lends 
support to the theoretical expectation that high-levels of educational attainment should 
characterize urban areas more so than in rural areas.   
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Without doubt, counties with a low level of educational attainment are 
concentrated in the provinces.  Five counties such as Goheung-gun, Boseong-gun, 
Hampyeong-gun, Jindo-gun, and the Sinan-gun, located in Chollanam-do province, 
account for only 2 to 3 percent of the total population with above a university degree.  In 
addition, Jangsu-gun and Imsil-gun counties in the Chollabuk-do province and 
Yeongdeok-gun and Seongju-gun counties in the Kyongsangbuk-do province also have a 
low percentage of education attainment above a university degree.  All of these counties 
together contain 50 to 70 percent of the total population engaged in agriculture and have 
a high percentage of labor force participation in agriculture, suggesting that levels of 
educational attainment are lower in rural areas than in urban areas.   
The next two independent variables are gender equity in educational attainment 
and female labor force participation; both represent women’s social status.  The ratio of 
the percentage of male educational attainment to the percentage of female educational 
attainment above a university degree measures gender equity in education, which has a 
mean value of 2.09 (SD 0.48).  This indicates that among the various counties in Korea, 
on average men obtain above the level of a university degree two times more often than 
women.  A value of 1.0 would indicate that men and women have an equal level of 
educational attainment above a university degree.  The value is greater than 1.0, men 
attain above a university degree more often than women.  Conversely, a value of less 
than 1.0 would mean that women attain above a university degree more often than the 
men.  As anticipated, men obtain a university degree or higher more often than women.   
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Among the various counties of Korea, the sex ratio of educational attainment 
ranges from a low of 1.34 in Seocho-gu, a county in the Seoul municipality, to a high of 
5.0 in Hampyeong-gun, a county in the Chollanam-do province.  There is no single 
county with a value of less than 1.0, clearly indicating that men, on average, have higher 
levels of educational attainment in all counties than do women in Korea.  As has been 
shown above, Secho-gu county was established to be one of the counties with the highest 
percentage of its total population attaining above a university degree, while Hampyeong-
gun county was one of the counties with the lowest percentage of educational attainment.  
Among the high educational attainment counties, the sex ratio of educational attainment 
over and above a university degree approaches a value of 1.0, indicating that gender 
inequality in education tends to be less in such areas.                             
Most counties in the seven municipalities and the Kyunggi-do province have a 
lower sex ratio of educational attainment than those of the other eight provinces.  In 
particular, the lowest values mostly occur in the Seoul municipality and Kyunggi-do 
province.  The ten counties, including Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, and Songpa-gu counties 
in the Seoul municipality have the lowest values of gender inequality in education.  On 
the other hand, all of the provinces except Kyunggi-do province have a high value, a 
level greater than 2.0.  Chollanam-do province has the highest degree of gender 
inequality in education in the country, denoting that men’s education attainment is 
between 3 and 5 times higher than women’s.  The counties with a high degree of gender 
inequality in educational attainment above the university degree, are in counties in 
Chollanam-do province, namely, Goheung-gun, Gangjin-gun, Haenam-gun, 
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Hampyeong-gun, and Sinan-gun counties.  These also show a lofty percentage of 
agricultural population and a low percentage of total population attainment above a 
university degree.  Educational attainment seems to be more equalized for men and 
women in urban cities than in rural areas.   
The variable percentage of female labor force participation has a mean value of 
43.99 (SD 9.6), which means that among the counties of Korea, almost 44 percent of the 
female population is employed in the labor force.  The percentage of female labor force 
participation ranges from a low of 29.3 in Gyeryong-si, a county in Chungchongnam-do 
province, to a high of 71.1 in Sinan-gun, a county in Chollanam-do province.  Although 
Gyeryong-si county, which has the lowest percentage of the female population in the 
labor force, belongs to Chungchongnam-do province, the other 10 counties with the 
lowest percentage of female labor force participation are all located in five 
municipalities (Pusan, Dae-gu, Kwangju, Daejon, and Ulsan).  As shown before, the 
counties with the lowest percentage of labor force participation are all situated in the 
municipalities.  These counties also tend to have the lowest percentage of female labor 
force participation.  On the other hand, the counties with the highest percentage of labor 
force participation are all located in the provinces, which tend to have the highest 
percentage of female labor force participation.  In 2004, unemployment rates were 
higher in seven municipalities and the Kyunggi-do province than in the other eight 
provinces.  Kyunggi-do province and the Seoul municipality each contain a population 
of 10 million people, which make them the largest population centers in Korea.  Even 
though the Seoul municipality is situated in Kyunggi-do province, both have an 
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equivalent GDP size, which is also the largest in the country.  Unlike the other eight 
provinces, the province of Kyunggi-do has a low percentage of agricultural population, 
indicating that it is more urbanized and industrialized than the other provinces.  However, 
since the national financial crisis in 1997, many industries and businesses have been hit 
hard by the recession.  In particular, white collar jobs were significantly reduced which, 
consequently, raised unemployment rates in the seven municipalities and in Kyunggi-do 
province where the percentage of the agricultural population was extremely low.  For 
instance, in 2004, unemployment rates for women were more than double those of the 
other eight provinces.  Accordingly, economic hardship appears to have a more 
significant impact on the job market in urban areas than in rural areas.                           
The next three variables, the sex ratio at birth (SRB), the divorce rate, and the 
marriage rate, all reflect the presence of traditional family norms and cultural values.  
The mean value for the SRB is 109.70 (SD 9.76), meaning that among the counties, 
almost 110 boys are born for every 100 girls.  This mean value is clearly higher than the 
biologically normal level of 105.  Among the 231 counties in 2004 that were surveyed, 
the SRB ranged from a low of 68.42 in Yeongyang-gun, a county in the Kyongsangbuk-
do province, to a high of 156.25 in Seongju-gun, a county in the Kyongsangbuk-do 
province.  Only 23 counties have SRBs of less than 100; most of the counties report 
SRBs greater than the normal level of 105.   
The counties with the highest SRBs are mostly found in the provinces 
(particularly, Chollanam-do and Kyongsangbuk-do) and show values greater than 128.  
Among the municipalities and provinces, the Dae-gu and Ulsan municipalities, and 
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Chollanam-do, Kyongsangbuk-do, Kyongsangnam-do, and Jeju-do provinces, all have 
SRBs of greater than 110.  Except for two municipalities (Dae-gu and Ulsan), most of 
the municipalities maintain a value of between 106 and 107, which is close to a normal 
level.  On the other hand, most provinces (except Kyunggi-do and Chollabuk-do) 
maintain a value of between 109 and 110.  Over all, the counties with the loftiest 
agricultural populations tend to have higher SRB values, and these counties are mostly 
found in the provinces.  This shows that the SRB tends to be higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas.                        
A second traditional family norms variable is the marriage rate, which shows a 
mean value of 8.22 (SD 1.9).  This indicates that among the counties, on average, there 
are 8.22 marriages per 1,000 persons in the segment of the population aged 25 and over.  
The range for the marriage rate varies from a low of 4.23 percent in Yeongyang-gun, a 
county in Kyongsangbuk-do province, to a high of 12.46 percent in Gwanak-gu, a 
county in the Seoul municipality.  It was not expected by the theoretical reasoning of this 
thesis that counties with a lofty marriage rate would be located in big cities such as the 
Seoul and Pusan municipalities, and counties with the lowest marriage rate would be 
located in the eight provinces (except Kyunggi-do province) with the highest level of 
agricultural population.  Furthermore, most counties with the highest marriage rate have 
a higher population percentage in the labor force, as well as women who are working.  
Given this situation, these statistics may be explained by the age distribution of the 
population of each region.  Since there is a strong tendency for young people to move to 
a city, agricultural areas will tend to contain a large number of the older and oldest 
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people in the population.  In fact, the aged-child ratio (persons 65+ divided by persons 0 
to 14) of five provinces (Kangwon-do, Chungchongnam-do, Chollabuk-do, Chollanam-
do, and Kyongsangbuk-do) is higher than that of the municipalities.  Among farm 
households, the proportion of people aged 50 and over is much higher in those provinces 
that have the highest total annual income from agriculture than in the municipalities.  As 
a result, most municipalities (which contain a large proportion of young people) tend, 
relatively, to have a greater marriage rate than do the provinces. 
The last independent variable is the divorce rate, which has a mean value of 3.89 
(SD 0.98).  This indicates that, on average, there are 3.89 divorces per 1,000 persons in 
the population aged 25 and over, among the various counties in Korea.  The divorce rate 
ranges from a low of 1.56 in Sunchang-gun, a county in Chollabuk-do province, to a 
high of 7.12 in Dongduchenon-si, a county in Gyeonggi-do province.  Sunchang-gun 
county, as well as three more counties with low divorce rate, Jangsu-gun, Imsil-gun, and 
Gochang-gun, are all situated in Chollabuk-do province.  All of these counties have a 
large agricultural population, indicating that traditional family norms are still more 
strongly embedded in the rural areas than in the urban areas.  Also, additional five 
counties with the lowest divorce rate, Ulseong-gun, Cheongsong-gun, Yeongyang-gun, 
Cheongdo-gun, and Bonghwa-gun, are all situated in Kyongsangbuk-do province.   
The ten counties with the highest divorce rate are all located in Incheon 
municipality and in Gyeonggi-do province.  Six counties (Jung-gu, Dong-gu, Nam-gu, 
Namdong-gu, Bupyeong-gu, and Seo-gu) from the total of ten counties housed in the 
Inchon municipality, and four counties (Dongducheon-si, Ansan-si, Siheung-si, and 
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Yangju-si) housed in Gyeonggi-do province all maintain a 6 percent level of the 
population divorcing, which is the highest level recorded in all the Korean counties.  As 
mentioned before, the Incheon and Seoul municipalities are situated in Gyeonggi-do, and 
all three areas are the most urbanized and developed in the country.  Consequently, 
traditional norms are likely to be weaker in the urban areas.  As expected, the divorce 
rate is much higher in the municipalities than in the provinces.     
Transformed Variables  
After conducting statistical tests for normality, two independent variables, 
percentage of total population in the labor force and sex ratio of educational attainment 
above a university degree, were found to be skewed.  As mentioned in a previous chapter, 
skewed variables often result in skewed error distributions, producing some form of bias 
in the analysis.  Thus, in order to avoid this problem, these two variables are in need of 
transformation. 
As shown in TABLE 2, the educational attainment variable has a skewness value 
of 1.6, which is greater than the accepted level of 0.8.  Given that the mean value is 
greater than the median, this is positively skewed.  However, after using a log 
transformation, the skewness of percentage educational attainment dropped from 1.6 to 
0.11, making its distribution near normal.  The mean value of the log of percentage 
educational attainment is 2.17 percent (SD 0.62), varying from a minimum value of 0.67 
percent to a maximum value of 3.74.       
The skewness value of the educational attainment sex ratio was greater than 0.8 
at 1.67, so this also needed to be transformed.  The positive skew of this sex ratio 
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variable was reduced by using the log transformation; its skewness statistic dropped 
from1.67 to 0.69.  The mean of the log of sex ratio of percentage educational attainment 
is 0.72 (SD 0.21), ranging from a minimum value of 0.29 to a maximum value of 1.61.                     
The independent variable, Sex Ratio at Birth (SRB) also has a positive skew of 
0.89 but this could not be satisfactorily transformed.  Because its skewness value only 
slightly exceeds a value of 0.8, the skewness of the SRB is not deemed to be a major 
problem.   
In summary, this chapter has presented descriptive data on the independent and 
dependent variables for Korea’s counties.  This has served to suggest how fertility varies 
among Korea’s regions depending on socioeconomic factors and women’s status and 
cultural values.  The next chapter will present the results of the analytical models 
estimated and will interpret the results.   
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of several OLS (Ordinary Least Square) 
regression models estimating the general fertility rate among the counties of South 
Korea.  These regression analyses will show whether or not the research hypotheses of 
this thesis, based on demographic transition theory (DTT), are confirmed.  Before 
examining the results of the regression models, I briefly discuss the diagnostic tests that 
helped in not only reducing both bias and statistical errors, but which also improved the 
models used in this analysis.  Afterwards, I will elaborate on the results of eight multiple 
regression analyses of the general fertility rates among the 231 counties of Korea in 
2004.   
Diagnostic Analyses    
In order to ensure the statistical accuracy of the regression analysis, prior to the 
analysis I employed several diagnostics.  First, I examined the distributions of the 
variables to determine whether the X and Y variable distributions were normal.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, two independent variables, the percentage of 
educational attainment and the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment, 
were both found to be skewed (the value of skewness was greater than 0.8) and were 
therefore modified by a log transformation.  As Hamilton (1992) notes, non-normal error 
distribution often results from heavily skewed Y and/or X distributions which, 
consequently, reduces the accuracy of the analysis.   
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In addition, I also expected that many of the independent variables would be 
intercorrelated, leading to problems with multicollinearity.  As mentioned earlier, this 
would make the estimation less precise and, eventually, unreliable because it would 
produce large variances for the estimation of parameters, resulting in larger than 
acceptable standard errors.  Therefore, I first appraised the zero-order correlations of the 
independent variables with the dependent variable of the GFR, examining the bivariate 
correlations among the eight independent variables (see TABLE 3).  As expected, all the 
independent variables are associated with the GFR, but three associations are opposite to 
the direction of the theoretical hypothesis of this thesis; namely, that the divorce rate is 
positively associated with the GFR, the percentage of the total labor force participation 
is positively associated with the GFR, and the percentage of the agricultural population 
is negatively associated with the GFR.   
However, given that the percentage of the agricultural population (r = -0.0004), 
the percentage of educational attainment (r = -0.012), and the percentage female labor 
force participation (r = -0.002) have low zero-order correlations with the GFR, these 
correlations would be not significant.        
According to TABLE 3, all three socioeconomic variables are weakly associated 
with the GFR: the percentage of total labor force participation is measured at 0.147, the 
percentage of the agricultural population at -0.0004, and the percentage of total 
educational attainment at -0.012.  This is not consistent with the theoretical anticipation 
because this thesis expects that socioeconomic predictors should be significantly 
associated with Korea’s fertility rate.  However, given that the agricultural population 
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has a negative relationship to the GFR, this suggests that the fertility rate would be low 
even in rural areas, regardless of urbanization.  As has been reported in the descriptive 
data, the labor force participation tended to be higher in those counties with a higher 
agricultural population, so the positive relationship between the percentage of labor 
force participation and the GFR would be taken for granted here.  Despite the wrong 
direction, the percentage of total labor force participation has the highest correlation with 
the GFR among the three socioeconomic variables.  Additionally, scatterplots visually 
show the association of the GFR with each of the eight independent variables, indicating 
their positive or negative correlation (see FIGURES 4-11).  
Most independent variables are highly collinear with each other, which indicates 
that there is a problem of multicollinearity.  In particular, all socioeconomic variables—
the percentage of the agricultural population, the percentage of total educational 
attainment, and the percentage of total labor force participation—all have a high 
correlation with each other or with the female status variables (the percentage of female 
labor force participation and the sex ratio of educational attainment) above 0.6: the 
percentage of agricultural population and the percentage of total educational attainment 
are correlated at -0.868, the percentage of the agricultural population and the percentage 
of total labor force participation at 0.855, the percentage of the total labor force 
participation and the percentage of total educational attainment at -0.796, the percentage 
of total educational attainment and the percentage of female labor force participation at -
0.818, the percentage of total educational attainment and the sex ratio of educational 
attainment at -0.763, the percentage of total labor force participation and the percentage 
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of female labor force participation at 0.948, the percentage of total labor force 
participation and the sex ratio of educational attainment at 0.711, the percentage of the 
agricultural population and the percentage of the female labor force participation at 
0.907, and finally the percentage of the agricultural population and the sex ratio of 
educational attainment at 0.778.  Additionally, two female status variables also have a 
high correlation of 0.717. 
In addition, one of the traditional norms and cultural values variables, the 
marriage rate, is highly collinear with all the other variables, i.e., the divorce rate (0.651), 
the percentage of total educational attainment (0.651), the percentage of the agricultural 
population (-0.736), the percentage of female labor force participation (-0.633), and the 
sex ratio of educational attainment (-0.602), except the percentage of total labor force 
participation.  Another cultural value variable, the divorce rate, is also highly collinear 
with the percentage of the agricultural population (-0.698) and the percentage of the 
female labor force’s participation (-0.637).  Consequently, most of the independent 
variables are collinear with each other, which could produce serious problems in the 
regression analysis.             
Therefore, I divided my analysis into eight multiple OLS regressions to eliminate 
these problems with multicollinearity.  After assessing the estimated OLS regression 
models, I examined for each equation the “variance inflation factor (VIF)”— the 
reciprocal of the tolerance (1/tolerance) for the independent variables in the regression 
equation—to determine whether or not there was a problematic degree of 
multicollinearity.  The zero-order correlations already indicated a high degree of 
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multicollinearity in the estimated regression models.  Thus, each model is completed by 
employing tolerance.  If the tolerance values of any independent variable in the equation 
are under 0.35, then its variable is not used.      
Accordingly, all socioeconomic variables are highly collinear with each other 
and with the female status variables, so they cannot exist together in one regression 
equation.  In other words, if any socioeconomic variable is involved with another 
socioeconomic variable or female status variable, some problematic variables must be 
eliminated from the equation.  Consequently, all eight variables cannot be together in a 
single regression model, but rather, they must be differently contained in several divided 
models.  Nonetheless, fortunately, two socioeconomic variables, the percentage of total 
educational attainment and the percentage of total labor force participation, have no 
problem with multicollinearity with regard to one female status variable and all of the 
traditional norms and cultural values variables.  Thus, only two regression models can 
contain all of the three different characteristic variables.        
TABLE 4 shows the effects of independent variables on the GFR for two 
multiple regression models, each of which contains one socioeconomic and one female 
status variable and all the cultural values variables.  The standardized regression 
coefficients are listed in parentheses under each coefficient in the models, and the 
significance of each coefficient is marked with an asterisk, depending on its significance 
levels.   
Now I will elaborate on a detailed interpretation of the regression coefficients 
and the statistical measures in each analytical model.           
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Models 1-2 
Model 1 examines the effects of five independent variables predicting the general 
fertility rate, including the percentage of total labor force participation, the sex ratio of 
the percentage of educational attainment, the divorce rate, the marriage rate, and the sex 
ratio at birth.  In the equation for Model 1, the percentage of total labor force 
participation represents socioeconomic development and is expected to be negatively 
associated with the GFR; the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment 
reflexes women’s status and is expected to be positively associated with the GFR; and 
the divorce rate, the marriage rate, and the sex ratio at birth all represent traditional 
norms and cultural values and are expected to be positively associated with the GFR 
(except the divorce rate). 
However, the results from Model 1 do not fully support of the above-listed 
hypotheses.  The results are as follows: 1) percentage of the total labor force 
participation is positively associated with the GFR; 2) the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment is positively related to the GFR; 3) the divorce rate is positively 
associated with the GFR; 4) the marriage rate is positively related to the GFR; and 5) the 
sex ratio at birth has a positive association with the GFR.   
In contrast to the DTT hypothesis, the percentage of the total labor force 
participation is found to be positively related to the GFR, and statistically significant at 
p<0.005.  The divorce rate is also not consistent with the hypothesis, and was found to 
be positively related to the GFR but not statistically significant.  This was an unexpected 
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result because the number of divorces has rapidly increased, along with the decline in 
fertility, during past decades in Korea.                                    
As hypothesized, the sex ratio of the percentage educational attainment is 
positively associated with the GFR, and statistically significant at p<0.005.  A higher sex 
ratio of the percentage of educational attainment, representing a higher inequality in 
educational attainment for women, should be associated with a higher GFR.  In addition, 
the marriage rate is also found to be positively related to the GFR, and statistically 
significant at p<0.005.  The sex ratio at birth is positively associated with the GFR but 
not statistically significant.     
In Model 1, an adjustment to the value of R2 is 0.524, meaning that all five 
independent variables explain almost 52 percent of the variation in the GFR; the F 
statistic is 69.81 with p = 0.000, indicating that the null hypothesis that all the regression 
coefficients in the population are zero can be rejected.   To compare the size and 
magnitude of the coefficients in the model, standardized regression coefficients have 
been calculated to measure the relative weights attached to the explanatory variables in 
contributing to the mean of the dependent variable.  In Model 1, the marriage rate (b* = 
0.896) has the strongest effect on the GFR, followed by the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment (b* = 0.421), the percentage of labor force participation (b* = 
0.312), the divorce rate (b* = 0.019), and the sex ratio at birth (b* = 0.006).   
In sum, the sex ratio of percentage of educational attainment is significant effect 
on fertility, as shown in Model 1.  However, given that the percentage of labor force 
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participation has a positive relationship with the GFR, this result does not support 
demographic transition theory.                               
Model 2 uses four of the same independent variables as Model 1: the sex ratio of 
the percentage of educational attainment (a female status variable), the divorce rate, the 
marriage rate, and the sex ratio at birth (all cultural value variables).  But Model 2 uses a 
different socioeconomic variable: the percentage of educational attainment.  Unlike 
Model 1, all coefficients in Model 2 are associated with the GFR in the direction 
hypothesized.   
Consistent with my expectations, the percentage of total educational attainment is 
negatively related to the GFR, and statistically significant at p<0.005.  In other words, as 
the percentage of the population who attain above a university degree increases, the GFR 
decreases, controlling for the effects of the other independent variables.  The sex ratio of 
the percentage of educational attainment also has a positive association with the GFR 
and is statistically significant at p<0.005, as was the case in Model 1.  As might be 
expected, the marriage rate is positively related to the GFR, and this association is 
significant at p<0.005.  The sex ratio at birth is also found to be positively related to the 
GFR, but not statistically significant.  However, contrary to Model 1, the association 
between the divorce rate and the GFR is negative in Model 2, which is the same 
direction as that hypothesized.  But this association is not significant.          
In Model 2, the marriage rate (b* = 1.010) has the strongest effect on the GFR, 
followed by the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment (b* = 0.433), the 
percentage of educational attainment (b* = -0.295), the divorce rate (b* = -0.089), and 
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the sex ratio at birth (b* = 0.022).  The R2 (adj.) is 0.514, meaning that the predictor 
variables together explain almost 51% of the variation in the GFR.  Although the R2 
(adj.) is slightly greater in Model 1 than Model 2, both have five coefficients, which 
together explain over 50% of the variation in the GFR.  In addition, the F statistic is 
49.56 with p = 0.000, demonstrating that the null hypothesis that all X variables in the 
model equal zero must be rejected.   
In sum, the percentage of educational attainment, the sex ratio of the percentage 
of educational attainment, and the marriage rate all have a significant effect on fertility, 
as shown in Model 2.  Importantly, the educational attainment predictor has a negative 
relationship with the GFR, in accordance with the DTT hypothesis.                                               
Robust regressions were also estimated for Models 1 and 2.  The results show no 
serious difference between the coefficients and standard errors in the OLS and robust 
models.  Both the OLS and the robust results of Models 1 and 2 also produce about the 
same value for R2 (adj.).  Given that the coefficients are nearly the same in the robust 
and OLS models, this thesis will rely on the OLS models results.   
Overall, the results of Models 1 and 2 show that the percentage of total 
educational attainment, the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment, and the 
marriage rate all have a significant effect on the GFR in the direction hypothesized.  
However, the percentage of total labor force participation is found to be significantly 
associated with the GFR, but this association is positive (which is opposite to that 
posited by the hypothesis).              
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Models 3-5 
Models 3-5 (see TABLE 5) estimate multiple OLS regression coefficients for the 
GFR with regards to both socioeconomic and cultural values variables.  In the three 
models, two women’s status variables, namely, such as the percentage of labor force 
participation and the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment, were 
eliminated due to the strong multicollinearity problem between them and the other 
independent variables.  In these models, we expected to find that all socioeconomic 
variables should be negatively related to the GFR, based on the DTT hypotheses.  
Model 3 examines four effects on the GFR of the percentage of the agricultural 
population, the divorce rate, the marriage rate, and the sex ratio at birth.  As expected, 
the percentage of the agricultural population, which measures socioeconomic 
development, was found to be positively related to the GFR and statistically significant 
at p<0.005.  In other words, for every increase in the percentage of the population 
involved in agriculture, there is a corresponding decrease in the GFR.  In the results, 
three traditional norm and cultural value variables are associated with the GFR in the 
direction hypothesized, except for the divorce rate; 1) the marriage rate has a positive 
association with the GFR, and is statistically significant at p<0.005; 2) the sex ratio at 
birth is also positively related to the GFR, but not statistically significant; and 3) the 
divorce rate is positively associated with the GFR but in the opposite direction to that 
which was hypothesized, and statistically significant at p<0.005.                 
Considering the relative effects (i.e. the standardized effects) of the four 
independent variables on fertility, the marriage rate (b* = 1.025) has the strongest effect 
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on the GFR among the independent variables, even though its association with the GFR 
is opposite to the hypothesized direction.  It is followed by the percentage of the 
population in agriculture (b* = 0.877), the divorce rate (b* = 0.188), and sex ratio at 
birth (b* = 0.036).  The R2 (adj.) is 0.545, indicating that the independent variables used 
in this model account for almost 55% of the variation in the GFR.  This is slightly higher 
than the R2 (adj.) values in Models 1 and 2.  The F-test also shows that the null 
hypothesis which states that all X variables in the model equal zero should be rejected, 
as F = 69.81 and p = 0.000.     
Model 4 also uses all three traditional norms and cultural values variables, but 
only one different socioeconomic variable: the percentage of educational attainment.  In 
Model 4, the percentage of educational attainment is negatively related to the GFR and 
statistically significant at p<0.005.  As hypothesized, the marriage rate has a positive 
association with the GFR, and is statistically significant at p<0.005.  The sex ratio at 
birth is also positively associated with the GFR but is not statistically significant.  
However, contrary to Model 3, the divorce rate was found in Model 4 to be negatively 
related to the GFR, and statistically significant at p<0.05.  The results are the same, even 
when the female status variable, the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment, 
is added to Model 4, as it was in Model 2.                           
Compared to Model 2, the partial regression coefficients in Model 4 are larger, 
except the marriage rate.  In particular, the effect of the percentage of educational 
attainment on the GFR is found to be significant in both models.  The partial slope of 
this socioeconomic variable increased from -3.088 in Model 2 to -5.947 in Model 4, and 
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the value of the standardized coefficient (b*) also increased from -0.295 to -.0.568.  
However, the marriage rate (b* = 0.962) has the strongest effect on fertility in Model 4, 
followed by the percentage of educational attainment (b* = -0.568), the divorce rates (b* 
= -0.136), and the sex ratio at birth (b* = 0.049).  The R2 (adj.) value is 0.442, a drop 
from 0.514 in Model 2.  The null hypothesis that all X variables in this model equal zero 
is rejected, as F = 46.48 and p = 0.000.    
Model 5 examines the effects of the same three cultural values variables and one 
different socioeconomic variable, the percentage of labor force participation, on the GFR.  
In this model, only two coefficients, namely, the percentage of labor force participation 
and the marriage rate, are significant at p<0.005.  However, the percentage of labor force 
participation and the divorce rate are found to be positively related to the GFR, which is 
contrary to the hypothesis developed earlier in this thesis.  These results are also shown 
to be exactly the same as those in Model 1.  Model 5 has all the same coefficients that 
were used in Model 1, except for the sex ratio of the percentage of educational 
attainment.  Consistently, the marriage rate and the sex ratio at birth are, in Model 5, 
positively related to the GFR.   
The partial regression coefficients in Model 5 are larger than in Model 1, except 
for the marriage rate; compared to Model 1, the percentage of labor force participation 
increased from 0.302 to 0.531; the divorce rate increased from 0.126 to 0.369; the sex 
ratio at birth increased from 0.004 to 0.016; but the marriage rate decreased from 3.070 
to 2.542.  In Model 5, the marriage rate has the strongest relative effect on the GFR, as 
b* = 0.742.  The R2 (adj.) is 0.452, a decreased from 0.514 in Model 1, meaning that all 
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explanatory variables together in the model explain almost 45% of the variation in the 
GFR.  The F-test shows that the null hypothesis that all X variables equal zero must be 
rejected, as F = 48.49 and p = 0.000.  
 The estimated robust results assure the validity of these three OLS regression 
models, showing that there is no serious difference or change between the coefficients 
and the standard errors.                 
Accordingly, the results of Models 3 thru 5 confirm that socioeconomic 
predictors are significantly associated with fertility, in keeping with the DTT, but the 
percentage of total labor force participation is related to the GFR in the wrong direction, 
as shown in Model 5.  In addition, the divorce rate is found to be positively associated 
with the GFR in Models 3 and 5, but this association is only significant in Model 3.           
Models 6-8 
Models 6-8 (see TABLE 6) estimate the effects of women’s status and 
traditional norms and cultural value variables on the GFR.  Unlike previous models, 
socioeconomic variables are not analyzed in these models.  Rather, two women’s status 
variables, i.e., the percentage of female labor force participation and the sex ratio of the 
percentage of educational attainment, and three traditional norms and cultural values 
variables, are employed in Models 6-8.  I expect to find that women’s status should be 
negatively related to the GFR.                
In Model 6, four coefficients for the sex ratio of the percentage of educational 
attainment, the divorce rate, the marriage rate, and the sex ratio at birth on the GFR, are 
examined.  The sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment measures gender 
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inequality in educational attainment above a university degree, representing a woman’s 
status.  As expected, the sex ratio of the percentage of educational attainment is 
positively related to the GFR, the divorce rate is negatively related to the GFR, the 
marriage rate is positively associated with the GFR, and the sex ratio at birth is 
positively associated with the GFR.  However, only the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment and the marriage rate are significant at p<0.005, in this model.     
Model 6 has all the same coefficients as Model 1, except for the percentage of 
labor force participation.  Compared to Model 1, the partial slopes for all coefficients 
increased in Model 6; in particular, the coefficient of the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment significantly increased from 13.059 to 18.741; the divorce rate 
increased from 0.126 to 0.481; the marriage rate increased from 3.070 to 3.124; and the 
sex ratio at birth increased from 0.004 to 0.020.  But the R2 (adj.) value decreased 
slightly from 0.524 in Model 1 to 0.484 in Model 6.                          
Model 7 uses another women’s status variable, the percentage of female labor 
force participation, along with all three traditional norms and cultural values variables: 
the divorce rate, the marriage rate, and the sex ratio at birth.  In this model, the 
percentage of the female labor force participation is expected to be negatively related to 
the GFR, the marriage rate and the sex ratio at birth are expected to be positively 
associated with the GFR, and the divorce rate is expected to be negatively related with 
the GFR.   
The results show that the percentage of female labor force participation and the 
divorce rate are associated with the GFR, but in the wrong direction.  In Model 7, the 
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percentage of female labor force participation and the marriage rate are significant at 
p<0.005.  Given that the percentage of labor force participation was found to be 
positively related to the GFR in Models 1 and 5, this result might be not surprising.  The 
divorce rate is also positively related to the GFR, which is opposite to the hypothesis of 
this thesis.  This result was also found in the previous models.  However, in Model 7 the 
marriage rate (b* = 0.801) had the largest relative impact on the GFR, followed by the 
percentage of female labor force participation (b* = 0.537), the divorce rate (b* = 0.065), 
and the sex ratio at birth (b* = 0.043).   
Compared to Model 6, the partial regression coefficients of traditional norms and 
cultural values variables are reduced in Model 7; the divorce rate decreased from 0.481 
to 0.428; and the marriage rate decreased from 3.124 to 2.742; but the sex ratio at birth 
slightly increased from 0.020 to 0.028.  The R2 (adj.) is 0.401 in Model 7, which is a 
decrease from 0.484 in Model 6.  The F-test shows that the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients are zero in the model must be rejected, as F = 39.56 and P = 0.000.                  
Model 8 uses all the variables in Models 6 and 7 to predict the GFR.  Once again, 
the percentage of female labor force participation is significantly and positively 
associated with the GFR, the sex ratio of the percentage educational attainment is 
significantly and positively related to the GFR, and the marriage rate is significantly and 
positively associated with the GFR.  All these coefficients are significant at p<0.005.  As 
shown in Model 7, the divorce rate is also positively related to the GFR, and not 
statistically significant in Model 8.  The sex ratio at birth is found to be positively 
associated with the GFR, but is not statistically significant.             
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In Model 8, the marriage rate (b* = 0.942) has the strongest relative impact on 
the GFR, as was the case in Model 7, followed by the sex ratio of the percentage 
educational attainment (b* = 0.485), the percentage of female labor force participation 
(0.250), the sex ratio at birth (b* = 0.015), and the divorce rate (b* = 0.010).  However, 
compared to Models 6 and 7, the partial regression coefficients of the two women’s 
status variables decreased in Model 8; the sex ratio of the percentage of educational 
attainment decreased from 18.741 in Model 6 to 15.032 in Model 8, and the percentage 
of female labor force participation decreased from 0.363 in Model 7 to 0.169 in Model 8.  
Among the traditional norms and cultural values variables, the coefficient of the divorce 
rate decreased from 0.481 in Model 6 and 0.428 in Model 7 to 0.069 in Model.  The R2 
(adj.) is 0.51, meaning that all coefficients in Model 8 account for 51 percent of the 
variation in the GFR.   
Robust regressions were estimated, and their results compared with the OLS 
results for Models 6-8.  There were no discrepancies between the OLS and robust 
estimates of the regression coefficients and the R2 (adj.).  This suggests that the OLS 
results for Models 6-8 are trustworthy.   
The women’s status variables in Models 6-8 are all significantly associated with 
the GFR.  The results show that the percentage of female labor force participation is 
related to the GFR in the wrong direction, but the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment is positively related to the GFR, in accordance with the 
hypothesis of this thesis.  However, the results of Models 6-8 are not consistent in terms 
of the divorce rate; in Model 6, the divorce rate is negatively related to the GFR, but it is 
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positively associated with the GFR in Models 7 and 8.  But the coefficient of the divorce 
rate is not statistically significant in all the models.  On the other hand, the marriage rate 
is significantly and positively associated with the GFR.  The sex ratio at birth is 
positively related to the GFR in all models but not statistically significant.                        
In this chapter, the results of several OLS multiple regression models predicting 
the GFR among the 231 counties of Korea in 2004 are presented.  We have focused 
primarily on the socioeconomic effects on the GFR, in order to test the DTT hypotheses.  
Also, the effects of women’s social status and traditional norms and cultural values on 
the GFR are introduced and examined.  As discussed earlier, due to multicollinearity 
problems among the X variables, the analysis was split into different eight regression 
analyses.                   
Over all, the results generally support the DTT, revealing that two socioeconomic 
variables are significantly associated with the GFR in the direction hypothesized.  In 
Models 2 and 4, the percentage of educational attainment is found to be significantly and 
negatively related to the GFR.  In Model 3, the coefficient of the percentage of the 
population involved in agriculture has a positive association with the GFR, and is 
statistically significant.  On the other hand, in Models 1 and 5, the percentage of labor 
force participation is found to be significantly associated with the GFR but in the wrong 
direction. 
In five regression models, the coefficients for women’s status were all found to 
be significantly related to the GFR.  In four models, the coefficient of the sex ratio of the 
percentage of educational attainment had a positive association with the GFR.  However, 
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the results of Models 7-8 show that the percentage of female labor force participation is 
positively related to the GFR, which is opposite to the hypothesis of this thesis.                        
Three effects of traditional norms and cultural values on the GFR are examined 
in the all regression models.  In each model, the coefficient of the marriage rate is 
significantly and positively related to the GFR; the sex ratio at birth has a positive 
association with the GFR, but is not statistically significant.  However, the coefficient of 
the divorce rate is significant only in Models 3-4, and signed in the hypothesized 
direction in three models (2, 4 and 5).     
The next chapter will interpret the OLS results of the hypothesis tests and discuss 
some of the implications of the analyses conducted in this thesis.                       
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In this thesis, my primary objective was to examine the effects of socioeconomic 
development on the fertility rates of the 231 counties of South Korea in 2004.  As shown 
earlier, Korea’s fertility rate not only fluctuates spatially but is also extremely low all 
over the country.  Given that only a few studies have investigated the variation in the 
current low levels of fertility among Korea’s counties, this thesis fills an important void.  
Most of my hypotheses are based on demographic transition theory, which posits that 
socioeconomic developments lead to fertility decline, and most were supported.  This 
last chapter will elucidate on an implication of this study and discuss the results of the 
analyses conducted.  Additionally, future work in this area of research will be suggested 
for further study.                    
Since 1960, South Korea has been going through a rapid demographic transition 
in mortality and fertility.  Previous studies have suggested that socioeconomic 
development and government-led family planning programs play important roles in 
causing these rapid transitions.  Since the early 1960s, under President Park’s 
administration, South Korea achieved a miraculous level of economic development, 
along with a significant reduction in fertility and mortality.  The conviction that a 
growing population obstructs economic development promoted the national family 
planning program instituted in 1962 as one strategy for economic prosperity.  
Consequently, national family planning programs were effectively implemented to 
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reduce fertility below replacement levels of 2.1, under the successive five-year economic 
development plans.   
During the 1970s, these family planning programs were designed mostly to 
promote high rates of contraceptive use and to encourage a norm of small families.  In 
particular, a 2-child family norm was facilitated with the famous slogan “regardless of 
sons or daughters, stop at two and raise them well.”  As a result of these government 
efforts, the total fertility rate (TFR) of Korea decreased from 6.0 in 1960 to the below-
replacement level fertility rate achieved in the mid 1980s.  However, even after 
achieving this desired replacement level of fertility, a 1-child family norm was continued 
through the slogan “Even two children for a family is too many for an over-crowded 
Korea.”   
Since the mid 1980s, this small family norm, as well as a heavy preference for 
male children owing to Confucian ideology, produced an abnormally high sex ratio at 
birth (SRB) in Korea.  It was strongly believed that human interventions such as prenatal 
sex identification and sex-selective abortion operated to disturb the biologically normal 
SRB.  In the early 1980s, the Korean SRB began to increase, and then finally reached a 
level of 117 in 1990, which is significantly above the normal level of 105.  In response 
to the unbalanced sex ratio of newborns, Korea’s population policies began addressing 
this problem, causing premarital sex and sex-selective abortions to be forbidden by new 
medical laws.  Due to these new regulations, the SRB dropped to below 110 in the mid 
1990s, but still maintained above normal levels.  
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During the 1990s, the TFR of Korea was at a level of near 1.4, far below 
replacement.  The rapid decrease in fertility and mortality caused new problems, such as 
an increase in the size of the older and oldest-old populations.  This new emerging 
problem made the Korean government reconsider the direction of future population 
policies.  Thus in 1996, a new population policy was adapted which is more concerned 
with the quality of the population than the quantitative control of the population.  
Despite moderate population policies and the government’s effort to maintain the 
replacement level of fertility, the TFR of South Korea kept declining to near 1.10.  In 
2004, the TFR reached approximately 1.16, which was the lowest fertility rate of any 
country in the world.  This trend of ‘lowest-low fertility’ has become the bottom line in 
bringing on a population policy shift towards a pro-natal policy in Korea.  
Given the situation, Korea’s fertility transition seems to no longer be a response 
to the government’s population policies.  Undoubtedly, Korean family planning 
programs have been very effective in population reduction through the last 40 years and 
through successive socioeconomic development, but since 2000, this has shifted to pro-
natal policies in an attempt to promote childbirth.  Despite the government’s program of 
childbirth encouragement in 2004, in 2005 the TFR declined to 1.08.                                   
Despite the absence of any effective family planning policy on fertility after 2000, 
the degree of socioeconomic development is still deemed to have a significant effect on 
Korea’s fertility decline.  In addition, women’s social status, which has been improved 
by socioeconomic development and/or the disappearance of traditional norms based on 
Confucianism, is also suggested to be an important factor in fertility decline.  Thus, this 
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thesis did not consider the effect of family planning programs in its analysis of Korea’s 
fertility in 2004.  Rather, the findings of the analyses conducted in this thesis focused 
more on hypotheses of demographic transition theory (DTT).    
Therefore, using the data from Census 2004 and the vital statistics report of 2004, 
standard DTT predictors, such as agricultural attainment, labor force participation, and 
educational attainment, all of which measure the level of socioeconomic development in 
the 231 Korean counties, were primarily examined to test the validity of the DTT 
hypotheses.  Additionally, this thesis also examined the effects of women’s status and 
traditional norms and cultural values on variation in fertility.   
According to the 2004 vital statistics, the mean value of the general fertility rate 
is 34.36 (equivalent to a TFR level of 1.04) among the 231 counties of Korea, ranging 
from a low of 21.6 (equivalent to a TFR level of 0.6) in Gangseo-gu (in the Pusan 
municipality) to a high of 54.31 (equivalent to a TFR level of 1.62) in Hwacheon-gun (in 
the Kangwon-do province).  This variance in the GFR among the counties is slightly 
greater than in the provinces, but even the high GFR values in their ranges are very low.   
As demonstrated in Chapter IV (see TABLE 1), most counties with the lowest 
GFR are found in the Pusan municipality, and their GFRs were equivalent to TFRs of 
less than 1.0.  Pusan municipality is the second largest city after the Seoul municipality 
(the capital city of Korea), well-known as one of the most socioeconomically developed 
cities in Korea.  On the other hand, most counties with high GFRs are found in the 
provinces (Kangwon, Chollanam-do, Kyongsangbuk-do, and Kyongsangnam-do) which 
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have high levels of agricultural attachment.  After all, these descriptive data lend support 
to the base of demographic transition theory.  
This thesis, however, has a unique strength which can contribute to the analysis 
of Korea’s current level of fertility, since the Korean government seeks to find solutions 
for the extremely low levels of fertility across the country.  Considering the fact that the 
government’s family planning policy presently has no significant effect on fertility 
change, the question remains: what could account for the geographic variance in fertility 
in Korea?  Also, what are the most influential effects of the low levels of fertility at the 
county level?  I hoped to find the answers to these questions through the analyses 
conducted in this thesis.  Furthermore, few analyses of a similar nature have been done 
previously, so this thesis could be a contribution to studies on the patterns of low fertility 
in Korea.   
I will now summarize the results of the analyses conducted in this thesis and 
discuss the implications of its findings.     
This thesis estimated several OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression models for 
predicting the GFR, in order to examine the hypotheses of the DTT.  Before estimating 
the regression equations, several diagnostic tests were employed to ensure the statistical 
accuracy of the regression analyses.  First of all, two independent variables such as the 
percentage of educational attainment and the sex ratio of the percentage of educational 
attainment were modified by a log transformation due to their skewness.  In addition, I 
appraised the zero-order correlations of the independent variables with the dependent 
variable of the GFR, and each with one another.  As shown in TABLE 3, many 
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independent variables are collinear with one another, implying that there is a problem of 
multicollinearity.  Scatterplots visually showed the correlated direction of these bivariate 
relationships (see FIGURES 4-11).  Considering the problem of multicollinearity, I 
divided my analysis into eight multiple OLS regression analyses.  After estimating the 
regression equations, I also calculated tolerances for each independent variable in order 
to make sure that each model had no multicollinearity among the variables.  All the 
tolerances were at statistically acceptable levels.     
Models 1 and 2 each included five independent variables which represented three 
different characteristics: socioeconomic development, women’s status, and traditional 
norms and cultural values (see TABLE 4).  In Model 1, three effects on the GFR, 
namely the percentage of labor force participation, the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment, and the marriage rate, were all significant.  However, only two 
independent variables were found not to be consistent with the hypotheses: the 
percentage of labor force participation and the divorce rate.  Particularly, despite its 
significant effect on the GFR in Model 1, the percentage of labor force participation was 
positively related to the GFR, in opposition to the DTT hypothesis.  The coefficient of 
the divorce rate was also signed in the wrong direction, but was not statistically 
significant.  In Model 2, all coefficients were significantly related to the GFR in the 
hypothesized directions.                                             
Consequently, the results from Models 1 and 2 seem to support the DTT 
hypotheses.  Two DTT variables, the percentage of labor force participation and the 
percentage of educational attainment, were significantly associated with the GFR in 
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Models 1 and 2.  Also, the percentage of educational attainment showed the 
hypothesized effect in Model 2, but the percentage of labor force participation was 
related to fertility in the wrong direction.         
The result of the percentage of labor force participation in Model 1 can be 
interpreted in two ways.  Firstly, according to the descriptive data shown in Chapter IV, 
most counties with the loftiest percentage of the population in the labor force were in 
provinces with the highest levels of agricultural attachment.  In other words, the 
percentage of the population in the labor force tended to be higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas.  As discussed earlier, this could be explained by the fact that after the 
national financial crisis in Korea of 1997, the number of white collar jobs was 
significantly reduced in urban areas, so that the unemployment rate became higher in 
urban areas than in rural areas.  After all, a high percentage of the population in the labor 
force found in the 2004 census would have been concentrated in agriculture.  Secondly, 
even though rural areas have a higher level of labor force participation than urban areas, 
their TFR level is not greater than 1.62, still indicating a very low fertility rate.  Given 
that the TFR range was 0.6 to 1.62 among Korea’s counties in 2004, both rural and 
urban counties have very low fertility, irrespective of the effect of labor force 
participation.       
Models 3-5 employed each of the socioeconomic variables, along with all of the 
cultural variables (see TABLE 5).  In these models, three socioeconomic variables, 
namely, the percentage of the population involved in agriculture, the percentage of 
educational attainment, and the percentage of labor force participation were all 
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significantly associated with the GFR in the hypothesized directions, except for the 
percentage of labor force participation.  Although labor force participation was opposite 
to the direction hypothesized in Model 5, other socioeconomic variables were 
compatible with my expectations.  Among the cultural value variables, only the marriage 
rate was significantly and positively related to the GFR in all of the models.  The sex 
ratio at birth was consistent with the hypothesis in all models, but not statistically 
significant.  The coefficient of the divorce rate was significant in Models 3 and 4, but 
only signed in the hypothesized direction in Model 4.    
Consequently, the results of Models 3-5 show that the DTT hypotheses work 
well for predicting the GFR, in spite of the fact that in Model 5 the percentage of labor 
force participation was related to the GFR in the wrong direction, which was also shown 
earlier in Model 1.  Also, contrary to expectations, the results of the divorce rate were 
not consistent in all three models.  This cultural variable is significantly associated to the 
GFR in the hypothesized direction only in Model 4.      
Models 6-8 examined the impact of women’s status and cultural values on the 
GFR among the 231 counties in Korea (see TABLE 6).  The two women’s status 
variables were both significant in the models, but only the sex ratio of the percentage of 
educational attainment was in accordance with the hypothesis.  The findings from 
Models 7 and 8 showed that the percentage of female labor force participation was 
significantly and positively related to the GFR, which is the same as the results of the 
percentage of labor force participation on the GFR in Models 1 and 5.  However, in the 
findings of Models 6-8, only one cultural value variable, the marriage rate, was 
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significant and with the hypothesized effect on the GFR.  The coefficient of the sex ratio 
at birth had the hypothesized relationship to the GFR but was not significant in all 
models.  The results from Model 6 showed that the divorce rate was negatively related to 
fertility, as hypothesized, but not statistically insignificant.              
The results from Models 6-8 indicate that women’s status variables are 
significantly associated with the GFR.  In particular, the coefficient of the sex ratio of 
the percentage of educational attainment above a university degree showed the 
hypothesized effect on the GFR, and was significant in all models in which it was 
examined.  On the other hand, the coefficient of the female labor force participation was 
significant but not consistent with the hypothesis.   
Through all these analyses, the DTT predictors seemed to be accounting for the 
variance in fertility rates among the 231 Korean counties in 2004.  Although the levels 
of the GFR are extremely low all across the country, it seems that socioeconomic 
conditions kept having an impact on fertility differentials in Korea.  Moreover, women’s 
social status has also had a significant effect on the GFR.  Since “the gender explanation 
of low fertility has received attention in recent studies” (D. Kim 2005: 16), many studies 
have suggested that there has been a remarkable improvement in gender inequality in 
educational attainment in Korea.  However, despite this improvement, men do still have 
a higher level of educational attainment than women in Korea.  The results of my 
analysis have shown that higher gender inequality in educational attainment above a 
university degree leads to a higher general fertility rate.   
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Previous fertility studies have suggested that the increasing incidence of divorce 
after 1990 has increasingly contributed to fertility decline in Korea.  Son preference also 
has been regarded to have an important role in Korean women’s fertility decisions, but 
Korea has achieved an extremely low level of fertility even with the culturally strong son 
preference.  Unexpectedly, my results have shown that traditional norms and cultural 
values about marriage and fertility do not seem to have a significant impact on fertility 
differentials.  With the exception of marriage, the effects of divorce and son preference 
on fertility were insignificant.                    
In this thesis, fertility variations and patterns of low fertility in South Korea were 
examined at the county level.  Since Korea achieved the replacement level of fertility in 
1984, its TFR level has gradually declined to the level of ‘lowest-low fertility.’  In 2004, 
county levels of the TFR varied from 0.6 to 1.62, indicating that, by and large, levels of 
fertility in Korea are extremely low.  In the analyses of fertility variations in low fertility 
levels, the three different characteristic predictors of socioeconomic development, 
women’s status, and traditional norms and cultural values were estimated to predict 
fertility.   
For future improvement of my analyses, the predictors could be further enhanced 
and developed.  For example, income levels and labor force involvement among white 
collar workers might be important socioeconomic indicators for predicting fertility 
change.  In my analysis there were two problematic variables, namely, the percentage of 
labor force participation and female labor force participation.  These two variables were 
positively related to fertility, a direction opposite to that of my hypothesis.  The 2004 
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census data showed high total level of labor force participation, along with female labor 
force participation, to be more concentrated in areas involved in agriculture than those 
the primarily white collar areas.  Consequently, these variables did not perform well in 
my analyses.  Thus, I suppose that different measurements, i.e., total labor force 
participation or female labor force participation at the white collar level would be better 
for predicting fertility.  Furthermore, income level would be a useful indicator measuring 
both socioeconomic conditions and women’s status.  Particularly, since many Korean 
women have obtained high levels of education and high-level incomes, this may have 
led to the pattern of low fertility in the country.  Therefore, female income levels should 
have an important effect on the low levels of fertility in Korea.  Nonetheless, these data 
were not available in the 2000 census and the 2004 vital statistics so were excluded from 
my analyses.        
In addition, for further study, the infant mortality rate (IMR) and the aged 
dependency ratio (ADR) could both be employed as explanatory variables.  According to 
demographic transition theory, the onset of infant mortality’s decline generally proceeds 
with a starting point of fertility transition.  Since the early 1960s, Korea has achieved a 
rapid fertility decline, along with infant mortality decline.  In accordance with this basic 
postulation of the DTT, in Korea the IMR has been related to this fertility transition over 
the past two decades.  Thus, this too should have a significant impact on Korea’s fertility.   
Another variable that could be included in future analyses is the aged 
dependency ratio (ADR).  The rapid fertility and mortality declines have produced 
unprecedented increases in the older populations in Korea.  The major municipalities 
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such as Seoul, Dae-gu, and Pusan, already contain large numbers of older and oldest-old 
people (Poston et al. 2004).  Presently, this population’s aging is occurring along with 
patterns of low fertility.  Therefore, it could be argued that the aged dependency ratio, 
i.e., persons 65+ divided by persons 15-64, should be associated with fertility.     
Moreover, for further my analysis, I hope to expand on this macro level study by 
estimating weighted regression equations.  Considering the population contained in each 
county, the weighted analyses provide even more precise results for predicting fertility 
variation among the counties.    
In response to the lowest-low fertility levels and the rapidly aging population, the 
Korean government has presently made a significant effort to boost its fertility rate.  
While the governmental family planning program was very effective in controlling the 
high rate of fertility between 1960 and the mid 1990s, this does not seem to have had a 
significant impact on the current low level of fertility in Korea.  In the mid 1990s, the 
Korean government moderated its family planning efforts aimed at maintaining the TFR 
level of 1.7, but the TFR of Korea has continued to decline, and it now approaches its 
current 1.0 level.  In 2004 the Korean government declared a policy shift to a pro-natal 
policy, focusing on “helping families by providing child allowances, childcare leave, a 
childcare support system, and tax exemptions based on the number of children” (D. Kim 
2004: 18).  However, in spite of this new pro-natal policy, the TFR declined from 1.16 in 
2004 to 1.08 in 2005.   
As with other low-fertility countries such as Japan and several European 
countries, the Korean government has attempted to promote childbirth by providing 
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economic incentives.  However, the small amount of economic support and the low level 
of benefits compared to those of other countries are, together, unlikely to have a 
significant influence on young Korean couples (D. Kim 2004).  Also, since these direct 
economic incentives have been mostly provided to married couples who already have 
children, the pro-natal policies do not seem to be very effective (D. Kim 2004) .  Several 
low-fertility European countries have already experienced the same failures with their 
pro-natal policies, which depend on economic benefits.                       
Undoubtedly, to encourage young Korean couples to have children, economic 
support for childcare would be a necessary component among the policy options.  
However, ultimately, it is more urgent to establish a better infrastructure and working 
environment for female workers that would enhance their roles as both mothers and 
workers.  Although the participation of Korean women in the labor force has gradually 
increased over the past decades, gender discrimination in labor opportunities and 
unreasonable treatment of female workers in the workplace (e.g., less benefits, lower 
salaries, and wrongful dismissal) still exist today.  I consider these factors to be a major 
obstacle for young Korean women when they make their fertility decisions.   
Accordingly, the future pro-natal policy direction should be focused on 
“improving the social status of women and gender equity, and on guaranteeing the 
involvement of fathers in childcare and rearing responsibilities” (D. Kim 2005: 18).  In 
actuality, some European countries, including France, have achieved an increase in the 
level of fertility by enhancing the compatibility of women’s work and childcare 
(Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997).                   
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In future studies, researchers need to study further the relationship of low levels 
of fertility and pro-natal policies.  Many countries from Europe and East Asia have 
already approached the lowest-low fertility level of 1.3 and have, consequently, enforced 
pro-natal policies.  Without exception, the low fertility issue is an urgent problem for 
South Korea to resolve, especially with the rapid process of the population’s aging.  In 
the future, more research about the patterns of low fertility is needed to provide solutions 
to this most challenging demographic issue facing Korea and the world.   
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics for General Fertility Rates and Socioeconomic, Female Status, and 
Cultural Variables: 231 Counties of South Korea, 2004 
    Standard 
Variable  Mean deviation Minimum value  Maximum value 
General fertility rate  34.36      6.50  21.60   54.31 
      Gangseo-gu County                      Hwacheon-gun County 
      (Pusan)                                     (Kangwon-do)    
   
 
Sex Birth Ratio  109.70      9.76  68.42   156.25 
 Yeongyang-gun County Seongju-gun County 
 (Kyongsangbuk-do)                   (Kyongsangbuk-do) 
 
 
Marriage Rate (25+)  8.22      1.90  4.23   12.46 
       Yeongyang-gun County  Gwanak-gu County (Seoul)   
      (Kyongsangbuk-do)       
        
 
Divorce Rate (25+)                   3.89      0.98  1.56   7.12 
                      Sunchang-gun County                  Dongducheon-si County  
      (Chollabuk-do)                  (Gyeonggi-do) 
 
 
%Educational                      10.63      7.00  1.96   42.24 
Attainment                                                       Sinan-gun County                          Gangnam-gu County (Seoul) 
                      (Chollanam-do) 
 
 
%Labor Force   57.39      6.71  43.40   77.7 
Participation      Dong-gu County                         Sinan-gun County  
      (Kwangju)                  (Chollanam-do)   
 
% Population  21.31      20.49  0.00   67.1 
Agriculture      25 counties in Seoul, Busan, Sinan-gun County  
      Incheon municipalities                 (Chollanam-do) 
 
 
% Female Labor Force 43.99      9.60  29.30   71.1 
Participation                     Gyeryong-si County                      Sinan-gun County  
                                                                                                           (Chungchongnam-do)                   (Chollanam-do)   
 
 
Sex Ratio of %Educational          2.09                0.48                        1.34                                               5.00 
Attainment (25+)                                                                               Seocho-gu (Seoul)                        Hampyeong-gun County  
                                                                                                                                                                 (Chollanam-do) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO)   
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TABLE 2 Skewness Tests for Normality  
 
Variable Mean Median Skewness 
General Fertility Rate (GFR) 34.36  33.68 0.62 
%Population Agriculture 21.31 15.8 0.42 
%Educational Attainment  10.63 8.81 1.6 
%Labor Force Participation 57.39 55.8 0.58 
%Female Labor Force 
Participation 
43.99 40.6 0.77 
Sex Ratio of %Educational 
Attainment (25+) 
2.09 2 1.67 
Divorce Rate 3.89 3.97 0.14 
Marriage Rate 8.22 8.2 0.13 
Sex Ratio at Birth (SRB) 109.7 108.98 0.89 
log%Educational  Attainment 2.17 2.18 0.11 
log Sex Ratio of %Educational 
Attainment 
0.72 0.69 0.69 
 
SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO)    
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TABLE 3 Zero-order Correlations of Dependent and Independent Variables: 231Counties  
of South Korea, 2004 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
              (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)        (6)       (7)        (8)        (9)       
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) General Fertility 
Rate (GFR)               __  
 
 
(2) % Population  
 Agriculture           -0.0004       __ 
 
 
(3) log% Educational                 
 Attainment          -0.012       -0.868        __               
 
(4) % Labor Force   
Participation           0.147         0.855     -0.796        __   
 
(5) log Sex Ratio of  
% Educational Attainment          0.096         0.778     -0.763    0.711         __      
 
(6) % Female Labor Force  
Participation             -0.002         0.907     -0.818     0.948        0.717         __ 
 
(7) Sex Ratio at Birth                            0.024         0.210     -0.214      0.243       0.230       0.233        __     
 
      
(8) Marriage Rate (25+)                        0.495        -0.736       0.651     -0.509      -0.603      -0.634     -0.170       __   
 
   
(9) Divorce Rate (25+)                          0.238        -0.698       0.432     -0.542      -0.461      -0.637     -0.123      0.651       __ 
    
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO)    
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TABLE 4 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the GFR on Socioeconomic, Female 
Status, and Cultural Values Variables: 231 Counties of Korea, 2004 
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
% Population Agriculture   
 
 
 
Log% Educational Attainment  
 
-3.088*** 
 
(-0.295) 
 
% Labor Force Participation 0.302*** 
 
(0.312) 
 
%Female Labor Force 
Participation  
 
 
 
 
 
Log Sex Ratio of %Educational  
Attainment 
13.059*** 
 
(0.421) 
13.422*** 
 
(0.433) 
Divorce Rate (25+) 0.126 
 
(0.019) 
 
-0.589 
 
(-0.089) 
 
Marriage Rate (25+) 3.070*** 
 
(0.896) 
 
3.458*** 
 
(1.010) 
Sex Ratio at Birth  0.004 
 
(0.006) 
0.015 
 
(0.022) 
Constant -18.474 3.731 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.524 0.514 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005; Standardized Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
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TABLE 5 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the GFR on Socioeconomic and 
Cultural Value Variables: 231 Counties of Korea, 2004 
 
Independent Variables Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
% Population Agriculture  0.278*** 
(0.877) 
 
 
 
Log% Educational Attainment  
 
 -5.947*** 
(-0.568) 
 
 
 
% Labor Force Participation 
  
0.531*** 
 
(0.549) 
 
%Female Labor Force 
Participation  
 
 
 
  
Log Sex Ratio of %Educational  
Attainment  
  
Divorce Rate (25+) 1.242*** 
 
(0.188) 
 
 -0.902* 
 
 (-0.136) 
0.369 
 
(0.056) 
Marriage Rate (25+)  3.511*** 
 
(1.025) 
 
  3.293*** 
 
 (0.962) 
2.542*** 
 
(0.742) 
Sex Ratio at Birth  0.024 
 
(0.036) 
  0.033 
 
 (0.049) 
0.016 
 
(0.024) 
Constant -7.911   20.121 
 
-20.174 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.545   0.442 
 
0.452 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005; Standardized Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
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TABLE 6 Multiple Regression Coefficients for the GFR on Female Status and 
Cultural Values Variables: 231 Counties of Korea, 2004 
 
Independent Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
% Population Agriculture  
 
 
 
 
 
Log% Educational Attainment   
 
 
 
 
 
% Labor Force Participation 
  
 
%Female Labor Force Participation  0.363*** 
 
(0.537) 
 
0.169*** 
 
(0.250) 
Log Sex Ratio of %Educational  
Attainment 
18.741*** 
 
(0.605) 
 
15.032*** 
 
(0.485) 
Divorce Rate (25+) -0.481 
 
(-0.073) 
0.428 
 
(0.065) 
 
0.069 
 
(0.010) 
Marriage Rate (25+) 3.124*** 
 
(0.912) 
2.742*** 
 
(0.801) 
 
3.226*** 
 
(0.942) 
Sex Ratio at Birth  0.020 
 
(0.031) 
0.028 
 
(0.043) 
0.010 
 
(0.015) 
Constant -5.111 -8.943 
 
-11.756 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.484 0.401 
 
0.505 
 
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.005; Standardized Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES 
 FIGURE 1 Total Fertility Rate: South Korea, 1960-2004 
 SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
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 FIGURE 2 Crude Birth Rate & Crude Death Rate: South Korea, 1960-2004 
 SOURCE: KOSIS, Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) 
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FIGURE 3 Geographical Subdivisions in South Korea  
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FIGURE 4 GFR & Percentage Population Agriculture (r = -0.0004) 
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FIGURE 5 GFR & Percentage Educational Attainment (r = -0.012) 
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FIGURE 6 GFR & Percentage Labor Force Participation (r = 0.147) 
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FIGURE 7 GFR & Sex Ratio of Percentage Educational Attainment (r = 0.096) 
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FIGURE 8 GFR & Percentage Female Labor Force Participation (r = -0.002) 
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FIGURE 9 GFR & Sex Ratio at Birth (r = 0.024) 
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FIGURE 10 GFR & Marriage Rate (r = 0.495) 
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FIGURE 11 GFR & Divorce Rate (r = 0.238) 
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